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ABSTRACT
I seek, in this thesis, by means of a critical exposition and 
comparison of Hegel’s Early Theological Writings and his mature 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to elucidate the 
relationship between human subjectivity, the self-conscious 
experience of humanity and the absolute truth which is absolute 
spirit, God. The apparent divorce of positive biblical narrative
f
from its reflective interpretation is not, it is to be argued, the 
result of the importing of critical philosophy into the domain of 
Christian experience. Rather, it is intrinsic to that very 
experience. The tension between positivity and inwardness, so 
central a problem to the concerns of the earlier philosophy has, 
by the time of the mature philosophy of religion, become an 
opportunity, rather than just a problem, for Christianity. 
Understanding the continuity between Hegel’s Early Theological 
Writings and the ostensibly very different speculative system, 
also enables one to understand the relevance of both to 
contemporary (and especially religious) experience.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REFERENCES
References to Hegel’s works in the text and endnotes are given 
with the following abbreviations:
ETW: Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971
This edition contains several of Hegel’s early theological essays. 
Those referred to in this thesis are indicated by the following 
abbreviations:
PGR: The Positivity Of The Christian Religion
SOP: The Spirit Of Christianity And Its Fate
Page enumeration in the case of these latter (PGR and SCF) 
always refers to this edition of ETW.
FK: Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977
LPR: Lectures On The Philosophy of Religion (1827), ed. Peter 0. 
Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988 (one 
volume edition)
PM: Philosophy of Mind (vol. 3 of The Encyclopaedia Of The 
Philosophical Sciences), trans. W. Wallace, Oxford University 
Press, 1971
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the problem of human subjectivity 
in Hegel’s religious thought, with particular regard to the 
developments between Hegel’s Early Theological Writings and his 
mature philosophy of religion. By the probiem of human 
subjectivity is meant the problem of the relationship between 
human self-consciousness and human consciousness of God.
It should be stressed that the term ‘human subjectivity’ does not 
(as is so often the case in non-philosophical English usage) 
suggest an arbitrary or relative understanding of truth. Rather 
(as in the German philosophical tradition) it connotes the 
manner in which truth is experienced in the self-conscious lives 
of particular human beings. The relationship between Hegel’s 
Early Theological Writings and his mature philosophy of religion 
remains a matter of some currency within contemporary Hegel 
studies. In particular it is debated whether or not the theological 
and existential idiom of Hegel’s Early Theological Writings (which 
were completed before 1801) is sustained in the mature Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion of 1827, or supplanted by a reductive
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philosophical account of the content of Christian belief. This 
thesis argues that a theological and existential problematic is 
not only sustained in the mature philosophy of religion, but is 
also a central factor in Hegel’s philosophical development 
towards the later theological works froiti the earlier ones.
Hegel’s reception in German intellectual life by the generation 
which immediately followed him was largely dominated by the 
divide between Left and Right Hegelians. With regard to his 
theology. Left Hegelians (such as Stirner and Ruge) asserted 
that Hegel’s mature philosophy requires the reinterpretation of 
Christianity in exclusively secular (and therefore social and 
political) terms. The development of this interpretative 
perspective leads to the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach and 
eventually to those of the young Karl Marx {1844 Manuscripts). 
Counter to this, the Right Hegelians (such as Rudolf Heym), 
asserted that Hegelianism provides a theological warrant for 
maintaining the political status quo (especially that of the 
hierarchical structures within the Prussian state).
Examination of each of these strands of thought in relation to 
the other raises acutely the question of what, if anything, in 
Hegel's thinking might be characterised as being specifically 
Christian in nature rather than just a secular philosophy of 
history and of culture. Equally important is the question of the 
significance of a faith in the reality of Jesus of Nazareth as an 
historical person (and as such the historicity of the entire 
biblical account) in relation to subsequent secular history. The 
reduction by the Left Hegelians of Hegel’s philosophy of religion 
to a mere anthropology is later echoed in Benedetto Croce’s 
What Is Living And What Is Dead Of The Philosophy Of Hegel (1915), 
in which the philosophy of religion is ranked amongst ‘what is 
dead’ (*1 ). It is the consideration of the two strands of 
interpretation just outlined as characterizing respectively the 
Left and Right Hegelians which contributed to the most radical 
of all critiques of Hegel’s thought in the nineteenth century, that 
of Soren Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard, Hegel’s ‘Christian’ 
philosophy of history represents the negation of any authentic 
personal faith, denying it any real existential content (*2).
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Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, two Protestant theologians 
writing at the same time as and later than Croce, present a still 
more radical critique of Hegel’s philosophical theology. 
Bultmann defines (all, rather than just Hegel’s) theological 
statements as anthropological statements ‘in code’; their real 
object is entirely human. Tillich defines God as whatever is 
‘ultimate seriousness’ in the experience of the believer. For 
Bultmann Hegel is an anthropologist who does not allow for the 
reality of God’s having spoken and speaking uniquely through 
the person of Jesus (*3). For Tillich Hegel fails to resolve the 
existential problematic without acknowledging the impossibility 
of the project as such (*4). Karl Barth in his Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans (1919) attacks Hegelian philosophical 
theology because, in his understanding, it fails to acknowledge 
the transcendent nature of God and so runs the risk of 
identifying Christianity with a particular cultural tradition such 
as Protestantism or the European idea of freedom (*5). In his 
Protestant Theology of the Nineteenth Century {1972), Barth makes 
his critique of Hegel even more explicit. He asserts that Hegel’s
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dialectical logic, when applied to theology, makes it ‘impossible 
for Hegel to grasp the true logic of Grace’ (*6).
if the religious dimension in Hegel’s thought has been relatively 
neglected in Hegel scholarship and only really addressed in the 
last thirty years, the same is true a fortiori of Hegel’s Early 
Theological Writings. Even thinkers broadly sympathetic to 
Hegel’s speculative theology have tended to underestimate the 
relevance of the early writings in relation to Hegel’s system as a 
whole. For example, Malcolm Knox (whose own translation was 
the first English edition of the Early Theological Writings in 1946), 
argues in A Layman’s Quest (London, 1969) that Hegel’s mature 
religious thought does indeed reduce religion to philosophy and 
thus abandons the existential emphasis of the early works (*7).
J. N. Findlay in Hegel: A Reexamination argues both that the Early 
Theological Writings are not significantly relevant to the later 
system and that Hegel’s mature concept of Absolute Spirit is 
theological only in a metaphorical sense (*8). Emil Fackenheim, 
in The Religious Dimension in HegeTs Thought (1967), a work 
concerned with the theological relevance of Hegel’s thinking as
12
a whole, states explicitly that although "the Early Theological 
Writings are important for Hegel's intellectual development they 
add little to the understanding of his mature thought" (*9). 
Nevertheless, Fackenheim argues that Hegel's philosophy of 
Absolute Knowledge is ultimately intelligible only in theological 
terms. In the same vein, Gillian Rose in Hegel Contra Sociology 
(1981), argues that Hegel’s political and social philosophy is 
persuasive precisely because of its theological basis (*10). 
Rowan Williams in Hegel and the Gods of Post Modernity (1992), 
argues that Hegel’s speculative theology does have within it a 
contemplative dimension and that this, as such, signals Hegel’s 
awareness not only of the connection, but of the difference 
between philosophy and religious worship (*11).
Most recently (and most relevant to this present thesis) a group 
of writers has begun both to study the Early Theological Writings 
in greater detail and to take the arguments therein more 
seriously in relation to Hegel’s later development. Raymond 
Plant in Hegel: an Introduction (1971) states his profound 
disagreement with Findlay’s contention that these early writings
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are of no decisive importance to the development of Hegel’s 
thought as a whole. Plant draws attention to the specifically 
theological origin (exemplified in the essay Faith and Knowledge 
of 1801) of Hegel’s concept of philosophy as a response to the 
need (Bedürfnls) implicit in the self-division {Entzweiung) in the 
Protestant culture of Germany in Hegel’s time (*12). The self­
division in question is the rift between theological 
consciousness and critical reason. However, Plant’s emphasis 
is more on the later philosophy as a resolution of the problems 
implicit in the early writings; and less on the continuity in 
Hegel’s central concerns in both groups of texts. Andrew 
Shanks in Hegel’s Political Theology deals at some length with 
Hegel’s early works, especially with their political and social 
relevance. For Shanks, Hegel’s mature philosophy of religion 
grows out of a concern for the political and social implications 
of modern Protestantism as it is exemplified in the Lutheran 
Germany of his day. In Shanks’ view, Hegel is principally 
concerned with the cultural just as much as the personal 
alienation implicit in modern Protestantism: a form of faith 
which legitimates itself by its own opposition to the rationality of
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the secular world (*13). Hegel’s diagnosis of the problem, 
according to Shanks, is already present in his early texts; but 
Hegel’s solution is presented only in the mature philosophy of 
religion. For Shanks, Hegel’s later work offers an ‘inclusive 
Christology’, designed to overcome the pietistic separation of 
the faithful from the world which he anaiyzes in his earlier work. 
Hegel’s Christian reading of history, on Shanks’ account, is 
indeed rooted in an authentic Christology. However it is also, 
and rightly, a philosophy of human history and of human culture 
as such. It is that philosophical and cultural focus which 
changes Hegel’s thought from the esoteric theology of a sect 
into a philosophical theology valid outside the time and culture 
in which it was written. Shanks’ emphasis is very much upon 
Hegel’s later work, and Hegel’s early writings are relevant only 
because his mature system overcomes the theological and 
cultural contradictions which Hegel has earlier exposed (*14). 
Counter to this, John Milbank argues, in Theology and Social 
Theory, that Hegel’s later philosophical theology cannot offer a 
Christian political ethic of any modern relevance; and that it 
cannot do so precisely because it evades rather than really
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resolves the tension between Christian faith and political 
citizenship which is outlined in Hegel’s earlier work. For 
Milbank, Hegel’s later thought fails to address this issue at all. 
Instead, it replaces the problem with another one; Hegel’s 
theological thought has become a philosophy of European 
culture which, in his mature writings, masquerades as a 
Christology (*15).
By contrast, this thesis both stresses the continuity in Hegel’s 
theological concerns and argues that Hegel’s later religious 
thought continues to articulate, not speculatively evade, the 
tension between Christian experience and secular reason which 
is anatomized in his earlier work. Hegel’s Early Theological 
Writings are thus necessary for any adequate understanding of 
Hegei’s reiigious thought as a whole. The key problem of 
Hegel’s early theology, I will argue, is the relationship between 
Positivity (the historically contingent form of Christian practice 
and belief) and Inwardness (the inner apprehension of such 
belief by the Christian believer). The same problem is explored 
in Hegel’s later philosophical writings, but in his mature
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philosophy of religion it is reformulated as a specifically 
philosophical problem with a specifically philosophical solution. 
Hegel conceives of philosophy as the most self-conscious mode 
of human knowledge and experience, as the only mode of 
consciousness which can heal the self-division implicit in the 
theological culture of his time. Yet Hegel’s mature philosophy of 
religion also includes an account of the difference, as well as the 
relationship, between Christian experience and philosophical 
reflection. Hegel’s mature religious thought can thus be 
defended against the charge that it ignores or falsifies the 
“existential” truth of Christian experience, such that Hegel’s 
philosophical response adequately addresses the antinomies of 
the Early Theological Writings even if it cannot fully resolve them 
all.
It is to be argued too that Hegel’s understanding of the specific 
importance of philosophy as a mode of human knowledge 
emerges in response to the theological problem posed in the 
early writings, and especially from his critical engagement with 
the thought of Kant. Thus the idea of Spirit, as set down in the
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Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate as a resolution of the problem 
of “inwardness” and “positivity” in Christian belief, already 
foreshadows the idea of Spirit which plays such a central role in 
Hegel’s mature religious thought and in the whole speculative 
philosophy. Hegel’s account, in the Faith and Knowledge essay 
and in The Phenomenology of Spirit of the cultural need for 
philosophy in his time, is a direct response to the self-division in 
theological consciousness which he analyzes in the Early 
Writings. His account of the relationship between philosophy 
and religion in the Philosophy of Religion itself is predicated in the 
Trinity, which directly address the problems at the heart of 
Hegel’s early theological work. Thus these problems shape the 
development of the later religious works beyond the starting 
point outlined in the earlier ones.
Hegel’s later thought, I will argue, is vindicated not only by the 
manner in which philosophy in the Hegelian mode can fruitfully 
contribute to Christian theoiogy, but aiso in that it does justice 
to the necessary difference between philosophical idealism and 
(Christian) religious experience. Indeed, Hegel’s philosophical
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theology continues to be relevant precisely because it explores 
the dimensions and the significance of that difference. One of 
the difficulties raised in writing this thesis is that whilst Hegel’s 
1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is specifically 
philosophical in idiom and coherently related to the structure of 
his mature system as a whole, his use of language in the Early 
Theological Writings is part historical and part theological in kind. 
Hegel’s formal philosophical terminology is thus directly 
relevant to the exposition of his later texts but only obliquely so 
to his earlier ones.
Chapter I undertakes a detailed reading of Hegel’s key early 
texts. The Positivity of the Christian Religion and The Spirit of 
Christianity and Its Fate.
Chapter II deals first with the emergence of Hegel’s 
understanding of the “need” for philosophy as a response to the 
self-division in the experience of his time. The terms ‘need’ 
(Bedürfnis) and ‘self-division’ (Entzweiung) are Hegel’s own. The 
remainder of the chapter is concerned with Hegel’s mature
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philosophy of religion. After an account of the transition in 
Hegei’s thinking between the stages of his philosophical 
development as represented in his Early Theological Writings and 
in the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and as 
represented in the Faith and Knowledge essay, there foilows an 
account of his concepts of Spirit and of Absolute Spirit in the 
mature system. The chapter then moves to a detailed analysis 
of Hegel’s Christology and shows that his mature theology of 
the incarnation is a response to the concerns of his early 
theological work.
A brief conclusion draws together the lines of argument from the 
thesis as a whole, relating Hegel’s mature position to the 
historical development which has been traced throughout the 
thesis. My exposition will thus, of necessity, be both 
historiographical and conceptual; and the emphasis will change 
accordingly at different stages throughout. I will attempt to 
signal such changes as clearly as is practicable.
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Chapter I
The Early Theological Writings
In this chapter will be outlined the formulation of the problem of 
subjectivity as set forth in Hegei’s examination of positivity in 
the Jewish and Christian religions in his early theological 
writings. Hegei’s understanding of Jesus’ critique of Judaism 
comes eventuaily (in The Positivity of the Christian Religion) to be 
repiicated in his own critique of Kant. Judaism, Hegel 
maintains, identifies religion with the Positive (objective and 
historical) to the exclusion of the subjective experience of 
religious truth. This identification, which Hegel understands to 
have been one of Jesus’ chief objections to the reiigious life of 
those whom he encountered, is repeated by Kant in his 
reduction of religion to morality. Hegei’s early writings mark a 
transition in Hegel’s thought, illustrated in the divergent 
attitudes to the role of morality in religion, i will use the German 
words Moraiitat and Sittiichkeit, the first referring to the moral 
choices of an individual self, the second -  commonly rendered
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into English as ‘ethical life’ -  referring to that ethical life as 
manifest in such an individual’s community or culture, in order 
better to clarify the distinctions which Hegel draws in regard to 
religion and morality and which he believes Kant to have 
neglected entirely. Initially, Hegel constructs the problem of 
human subjectivity in theological rather than philosophical 
terms, exploring the relation of freedom and human reason to 
the Positive as manifest in historically existing forms of human 
(religious) belief. It will be demonstrated how this early account 
of human subjectivity in essentially theological terms prefigures 
later accounts of Geist in the more mature philosophical system.
The transition in the Early Theological Writings, from The Positivity 
of the Christian Religion (1797) to The Spirit of Christianity and its 
Fate (1800), is especially interesting in terms of Hegel’s 
intellectual development, as it highlights his rejection of the 
Kantian Ethics immediately after having endorsed the same 
through his account of Jesus of Nazareth as the embodiment of 
the Kantian credo. This analysis of the Early Theological Writings 
will only deal in any depth with the essays: The Positivity of the
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Christian Religion and The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate. There 
is also an important transition from an hostility, in the first of 
these essays, to all historically embodied religion to a more 
mature understanding of the Positive as a necessary stage in 
the development of religious consciousness in the second. 
Hegel articulates this development in terms of Geist (spirit) and 
Schicksal (fate) and the role of each of these respectively in 
constituting and limiting human freedom.
(i) Volksreligion
Hegel, like Herder before him, had a very strong sense of the 
German Reformation’s incompleteness. Those who came after 
Luther and who claimed to have inherited Luther’s task, had 
signally failed in their attempt to establish a single unified 
Protestant church, even for the German-speaking world. This 
failure was a source of some profound regret for both Herder 
and Hegel alike, each of whom imagined the creation (or, in 
Herder’s case, re-establishment) of Volksreligion as the yet 
unachieved goal towards which German society (and for Hegel
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all Christendom) should strive. Herder maintained, in his 
identification of \/o//csre//g/on with a pan-Germanic culture, that 
the failure of Luther’s successors was a failure to enable 
Christianity to encompass the German folkloric tradition: it had, 
he believed, usurped it. Herder’s achievement included his 
formulation of historical evolution as the advancement of 
individuals and communities through adaptation over time to 
environmental factors; an idea which was to prove enormously 
influential upon the young Hegel. However, such influence was 
somewhat paradoxical: Herder’s literary movement (later called 
by the name ‘Sturm und Drang’) was a pre-Romantic reaction to 
the neo-classicist formalism epitomized in eighteenth century 
Germany by Winkelmann and his school. Paradoxical because, 
long after the influence of neo-classicism in German cultural life 
may be said to have peaked, it was precisely to a real or 
imagined ancient Greece, rather than to an almost entirely 
imagined ancient Germany, that Hegel turned for his own model 
of Volksreligion. For Hegel, Herder’s ancient German model was 
not only exclusive of all non-Protestant Christendom, but of all 
non-German Protestant Christendom too; whereas he saw the
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Hellenic world as the inspiration for his own idea of Volksreligion. 
This view of Volksreligion is first expounded in his eulogy of 
Socratic Athens, The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate: the Spirit is 
seen as the source of individual and communal identity.
In The Life of Jesus, the very earliest of his Eariy Theoiogicai 
Writings, Hegel had already contrasted Christianity, both 
historical and contemporary and very much to its own detriment, 
with the religious life of ancient Greece (*1). He argues that the 
former, for example, teaches a belief in the efficacy of prayer, 
the intercession of a supernatural and external deity in the 
disordered affairs of men; whilst the latter epitomizes a harmony 
between the social and the ethical. He contrasts Greek religious 
and social life, united as something entire of itself, with 
Christianity, divided against itself, in which people look beyond 
the world as they experience it to a distant and supernatural 
God. For Hegel, at this point, Christianity is a religion of people 
who are in the world but not of it; the world is a place of struggle 
for redemption, but the source and object of redemption is 
always beyond the world. Even for such an early work there is
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an attempt to clarify the problem of human subjectivity which he 
believed to constitute the crisis in contemporary Protestant 
theology. Very broadly, there is a tension between ‘inwardness’ 
and the need for a positive articulation of the content of 
Christian belief. The one, inheriting the Lutheran theological 
tradition, refers to the belief that all individuals must experience 
for themselves the reality of salvation, which is conceived of as 
radically independent of any ecclesiastical structure; the other, 
essential to any socially embodied religious practice, cannot be 
reduced to the private experience of the individual. It is with the 
problem of positivity and inwardness, namely that of how to 
reconcile the existential authenticity with the cultural objectivity 
of Christian belief, and with the responses to it in the intellectual 
life of the Germany of his time, that Hegel’s Early Theological 
Writings are concerned.
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THE POSITIVITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION
(II) Protestantism and Inwardness
T. M. Knox prefaces his translation of Hegel’s The Positivity of the 
Christian Reiigion with the note:
“Hegel’s surviving manuscript begins here and its original 
exordium is lost. It probably dealt with the concept of Positivity” 
(PGR 67 et seq.). In the absence of Hegel’s own introduction it is ■ 
necessary to derive his conception of Positivity from his later 
exposition in the same work. Hegel, at this stage, means by the 
positivity of the Christian religion three things: the objectively 
existing institutions and practice of the Christian religion; the ’ 
commonly and explicitly articulated form of Christian doctrine, 
which defines the Church as a community of believers; and the 
Church as a social and therefore implicitly political entity, 
existing alongside and interacting with the secular expression of 
human society. The problem of positivity and inwardness arises 
in a particularly acute form for Hegel because of his commitment 
to the Lutheran tradition. For the Catholic believer, faith is
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intrinsically social and the spiritual life of the individual is 
necessar/Zy mediated by the believer’s participation in the Body 
of Christ which is the Church. For the Anglican, a range of 
different understandings of justification and of the Church are 
reconciled both by the legal establishment of the Anglican 
Communion and by the inclusive character of the sixteenth 
century theological settlement, the Thirty-nine Articles.
However, for the Lutheran the key doctrine is that of justification 
by faith alone. The Lutheran doctrine of the Church, and of the 
relationship between Church and State, is necessarily 
secondary. For Lutheranism, the problem of positivity and 
inwardness is thus the problem of how any socially and 
historically objective mode of Christian belief can exist without 
falsifying the truth of inner experience; and how that inner 
experience can be reconciled to the idea of a Christian 
community, so that there are not as many different forms of 
Christianity as there are individual Christians.
As Hegel writes:
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“You may advance the most contradictory speculations about 
the Christian religion but no matter what they be, numerous 
voices are always raised against you, alleging that what you 
maintain may touch on this or that system of the Christian 
religion but not on the Christian religion itself. Everyone sets up 
his own system as the Christian religion and requires everyone 
else to envisage this, and this only” (PCR 67).
Hegel in his Early Theological Writings seeks to demonstrate the 
need for the Positive in some form or another, in order to 
counter the lapse of individuals into self-defeating inwardness 
and so to restore a real sense of community to church 
congregations. However, quite in what the Positive should 
consist is problematic, because there is, in modern Protestant 
Europe, no longer any ground which can authoritatively validate 
the claim of any particular religious persuasion to constitute the 
Positive.
Hegel’s conceptual analysis of the problem of inwardness and 
positivity is also a cultural and an historical critique of modern 
Christianity and, more specifically, of modern Protestantism.
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Hegel commits himself unambiguously to the principles of the 
religious autonomy of the individual and of the full engagement 
of the Christian in the secular world which have been central to 
the Lutheran tradition since the Reformation. Yet he is equally 
and acutely aware that the development of Protestant 
Christianity in his time has led neither to rational autonomy in its 
adherents nor to their reconciliation with the claims of the 
modern secular world. The questions which Hegel asks in his 
Early Theological Writings are: how and why does the objective 
existence of the Christian religion become not a means, but an 
obstacle to the true expression of the Christian faith? How and 
why does Christianity become a ‘positive’ religion in precisely 
the sense of that Pharisaic idolatry from which Christ sought to 
liberate humanity?
The Pharisees first claimed, then established and finally abused, 
authority in matters of law. The religious communities of the 
early Christian Church were communities in a very real sense, 
as opposed to the notional sense of community which had come 
to characterize Judaism at the time of Jesus. Only some time
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after the patristic period did the Church become big and 
powerful enough for its real sense of community to be similarly 
threatened or abused. By Luther’s time, the Church was, in 
Hegel’s view, largely the embodiment of an oppressive dogmatic 
framework which pandered to, rather than swept away, 
superstition and ignorance at every level within a Christian 
community which now lacked any real sense of common 
identity.
Hegel, in his early works, is thus concerned with a problem 
which arises both from the structure of Lutheran theology and 
from the history of Lutheran Christianity. He is also concerned 
with how that problem is given particular urgency by both the 
philosophical discourse and the general culture of his time and 
place. It is his engagement with that culture and philosophical 
discourse which will now be addressed.
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(iii) Positivity in Judaism and Kantian Ethics
German distinguishes between Moralitat sn6 Sittlichkeit, the 
former referring to the moral choice and responsibility of an 
individual, and the latter to social ethical norms, perhaps even 
those specific to a particular cultural tradition. This distinction 
is useful as an illustration of first, the positivity of the Jewish 
religion as Hegel finds it described in scripture, and secondly, of 
what he understands in this text to be the content and force of 
Kant's moral philosophy. It is important to note that Hegel 
himself made no such discriminatory use of the terms Moralitat 
and Sittlichkeit until he wrote the lectures in 1820 which 
eventually became the Beriin Encyclopaedia (*2). However, the 
contrast which these terms are here used to illustrate is, 
nevertheless, made implicitly even at this early stage.
Henceforth, I shall use these terms as a means of distinguishing 
between the personal moral responsibility of an individual, and 
the moral norms and customs of the society to which that 
individual belongs and from which that same individual may, or 
may not, derive the evaluative criteria which inform personal
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moral choices. Hegel maintains that there is a potential for 
conflict between the moral values of the community and those of 
any member of such a community. He argues that Biblical 
Judaism (and I shall later argue Kantian ethics) lacks the 
conceptual resources to understand such a conflict (PCR 7 5 - 
77).
Positivity and Judaism
Before turning to the Kantian ethics and Hegel's critique thereof, 
Hegel's account of positivity in Judaism must be outlined in 
order to establish a contextual framework for that critique. 
Judaism at the time of Jesus was dominated in its canonic 
legislature by the Pharisaic party. The importance of the law of 
Moses and its interpretation into a practicable rubric was 
accepted at that time by all religious Jews. However,
Pharisaism, in these troubled times of Roman occupation, took 
interpretation of the law to gross extremes, judged by all 
hitherto accepted standards of practicability. Jesus' own 
reported words: “The Sabbath was made for man, not man for 
the Sabbath", for example, illustrate reaction to such extremes.
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The Sittlichkeit sense of moral law (which is, whether incidentally 
or not, at the heart of the Mosaic law), is not only at all times 
held to be superior to the moral choice in the sense of Moraiitat, 
but has, in Hegel’s view, extinguished it altogether. The law has 
been turned into an end in itself rather than being a means to 
higher moral ends. The power of Judaic legalism held authority 
through fear -  either of judicially enforced punishment here and 
now for the lack of obedience to the law or, compounded by 
prevalent superstitions based upon ignorance of what lies 
beyond death, of retribution hereafter. The Pharisees in 
particular made use of this latter notion, having themselves 
introduced into Judaism for the first time a belief in a life after 
death. The word of God cannot be justified but nor can it be 
questioned. Freedom of moral choice, then, either played no 
part at all in the life of the community -  which amounted to a 
denial of moral autonomy -  or it simply did not coincide to any 
but an incidental (rather than a willed) degree with the ethical life 
of the community. Hegel refers to the ‘mechanical slavery' of the 
members of such a community and writes:
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“And nothing but pride in this slavish obedience to laws not laid 
down by themselves was left of the Jewish spirit which already 
was deeply mortified and embittered by the subjection of the 
state to a foreign power" (PCR 68).
However, he stresses that it was not the law itself which was at 
fault but rather the legalistic application of it by the Pharisees 
(and others of the same mentality) in a nigh unworkable manner 
to every dimension of life. Indeed, he writes of Jesus with 
regard to the ‘sacred books' of the Jews:
“Jesus found the highest moral principles there -  he did not set 
up new ones. With Matthew Oh 22 v.37 ‘Thou shalt love the Lord 
they God with all thy heart’, compare Deuteronomy Oh 6 v.5 
which reads: ‘And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might’. He also 
compares strictures of the Mosaic law from Leviticus with 
Matthew Ch7 v.12: ‘Whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
you, do ye even so to them’, it would have been remarkable 
indeed if a religion like the Jewish, which had made God as 
political legislator, had not also contained purely moral 
principles" (PGR 70).
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Of Jesus he writes:
“He undertook to raise religion and virtue to morality and to 
restore to morality the freedom which is its essence" (PCR 69).
To enable the positivity of the Jewish religion to be restored to 
what it had been before the Pharisaic reduction of it to 
‘mechanical slavery', it is essential for the individual community 
member to have moral freedom in electing the values prescribed 
by the Sittlichkeit That freedom, by the exercise of the 
individual’s own ‘good will’, must make those values that 
individual’s own.
For Hegel, there is a close analogy between the condition of the 
Jewish people at the time of Christ and that of Protestant 
Germany at the time in which he was writing. The early 
Christians were faced with a conflict between the written law of 
Judaism and the spirit of moral freedom within them. German 
Christians at the end of the eighteenth century are faced with a 
similar opposition between the ‘positive’, that is, historically
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existing and transmitted, form of the Christian faith and the 
desire for a living faith which their consciousness of the cultural 
sterility of the Christian tradition in their time and nation has 
aroused in them.
The source of Hegel’s analogy between Pharisaic Judaism and 
modern Protestantism is his analysis of how the Protestant 
Christianity of his time has come to be positive in a damaging 
sense: that is, how the external forms of Christian practice have 
come to be dissociated from the living spirit of Christian faith. 
As Hegel puts it:
“The special characteristic of the Jewish religion -  that bondage 
to law from which Christians so heartily congratulate 
themselves on being free -  turns up once more in the Christian 
Church” (PCR 139).
For Hegel, this development has two main sources: the 
separation of Christian practice and feeling from the rest of 
human life in society, and the separation of religious 
consciousness from secular intellectual life. Hegel traces both 
of these developments to the tendency in modern Protestantism
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to constitute not only a private society but a kind of 
ecclesiastical state opposed to the secular power (PCR 135). 
Protestantism enjoins its adherents to participate fully in the 
secular world, but it does so on terms which imply opposition to 
secular morality and reason. The result is the spiritual 
alienation of a religion which declares spiritual truth to be alien 
to natural reason and accessible only to pious feeling: a state of 
inner conviction which is necessary for salvation and yet wholly 
beyond the individual’s command:
The main difference between Jews and Christians comes to 
this: that while, in Judaism, only actions were commanded, the 
Christian Church goes further and commands feelings, a 
contradiction in terms ” (PCR 140).
However, because modern Protestantism allows for no real 
difference between the spheres of religious and secular life, the 
modern Protestant Christian is forced into a life less of 
hypocrisy than of self-deception:
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“In trade and commerce the ordinary man appears, but he is a 
different person altogether on Sundays or under the eyes of his 
co-religionists or in reading his prayer-book. To charge a man 
like this with hypocrisy is often too harsh, because hypocrisy 
strictly entails consciousness of the contradiction between the 
label given to it and the motives behind it; in this instance this 
consciousness is altogether lacking, and the man is not a unity 
at all" (PCR 141).
The effect is a religion of command, not participation; of 
passivity, not activity (v. PCR 137). To be sure, modern 
Protestantism, unlike Judaism, is primarily a culture of inward 
feeling, not outward ritual observance. Protestantism is 
nevertheless as positive as Judaism, because its injunctions 
take precedence over the subjectivity of its adherents:
“One leading trait in the Church’s moral system is its erection on 
religion and our dependence upon the deity. Its foundation is 
not a datum of our minds, a proposition which could be 
developed out of our own consciousness, but rather something 
learned. On this view, morality is not a self-subsistent science
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or one with independent principles; neither is the essence of 
morality grounded on freedom, i.e. it is not the autonomy of the 
will" (PCR 135).
Thus, the Christian Church becomes destructively positive when 
the will and consciousness of its members become 
heteronomous: when they are divided against themselves. This 
is the point at which Kantian thought becomes relevant to 
Hegel’s theological critique. For Hegel in 1797, Kant’s moral 
philosophy promises a great deal. It does so because it is about 
the autonomy of human reason as a guide to conduct, and yet 
also about the autonomy of faith and the difference between the 
secular and the spiritual domains. Kant argues (3*) that rational 
autonomy is not just compatible with, but the only legitimate 
source of, moral conduct. However, he also argues that, whilst 
reason can describe the conditions which must be fulfilled if 
such conduct is to be possible, it cannot describe how such 
conduct really is possible. Reason, according to Kant, cannot 
explain the mystery of moral motivation; it must give way to 
faith.
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Kant’s philosophy is thus directly relevant to the theological 
predicament which Hegel outlines in The Positivity of the Christian 
Religion. In this early essay Hegel refers directly to Kant only in 
a few pages and in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate (1800) at 
only slightly greater length. However, I will attempt to show that 
Kant is the implicit philosophical interlocutor throughout Hegel’s 
early works, and that his engagement with Kant is one of the 
most important sources of the development of his position from 
1797 to 1800 and beyond.
Before arguing this case with detailed reference to Hegel’s own 
text I shall first present a brief account of Kant’s moral 
philosophy on its own terms, basing my exposition upon Kant’s 
argument in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, the most 
concise formulation of Kant’s ethical thought. I will then turn to 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy as set out in his 
Early Theological Writings. It should be noted that this later 
section is purely expository and I make no claim to its offering 
an independent analysis or assessment of Kant’s ethical 
thought. It should also be noted that Hegel’s discussion of Kant
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in the Early Theological Whtings is often oblique and rarely refers 
directly to Kant's texts. My use of the Groundwork is therefore 
intended only to provide a point of reference for the later 
examination of Hegel’s criticism of Kant; it is not meant to imply 
that this is the text upon which Hegel based his own critique.
Kant’s moral philosophy rests upon a deontology or ‘theory of 
obligation’. It is tightly constructed out of the interrelated 
concepts of duty, law, the categorical imperative (as opposed to 
hypothetical imperatives) and the belief that the only wholly 
good thing in the world is the good (because truly autonomous) 
will. For Kant, to be moral (that is, to act morally) is to be free 
and to be free is to be determined by one's rational will. To be 
determined in any other way, whether by the command of 
another or by one’s own unexamined feelings, is to be unfree 
through being in bondage to a motivation external 
(heteronomous) to one’s rational self. That one is surrounded 
by such motivations does not absolve one of the ‘duty’ to strive 
for the good in opposition to instinct; one must subordinate 
one’s desires to the greater moral good, in whatever that end 
might consist (*4).
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Kant maintained that the universalisability of a particular moral 
choice was its justification. If what one chooses to do is not 
only right for one here and now, by whatever criteria one might 
choose, but is also right for anyone at any time under the same 
conditions of action, then it is a moral action. For Kant, the key 
principle of morality, the categorical imperative, involves both a 
formula of autonomy and a formula of universalisable law (*5). 
The two formulae are closely connected, for Kant requires not 
only that moral agents should act in accordance with a law valid 
for all rational beings, but also that they “ought never to act 
except in such a way that (they) can also will that (their) maxim 
should become a universal law" (*6). Kant's distinction between 
a law and a maxim is important, because it distinguishes 
between the rational content of an act and the inner disposition 
which prompts it. One is enjoined to act not just in accordance 
with the moral law, but for the sake of it. It is not, therefore, 
morally right to act in accordance with the moral law because of 
a desire for approbation, or from a fear of censure, according to 
the cultural norms of a particular society, however enlightened 
those norms may be (*7). In the Kantian view, rationality.
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autonomy and universalizability are indissolubly connected and 
form the basis of the moral law. One must act rationally 
because one must act in conformity with a rationally justified 
moral law. One must act autonomously because one must be 
prompted to act only by one's reverence for the law itself (*8). In 
order so to act, one must regard oneself only as a member of a 
community of rational beings, not as a particular person with 
particular interests (*9).
This conception of moral freedom raises acutely the problem of 
the context and motivation for moral conduct. Kant himself 
explicitly acknowledges that his explanatory framework cannot 
adequately explain how the categorical imperative can be 
practicably enacted. Kant's concept of moral freedom, like his 
concepts of God and immortality, is a regulative ideal: that is, an 
ideal which can be conceived of only analogically, not 
substantively, because its content hints at something beyond 
the sphere of human experience. One has to think as if the 
categorical imperative could directly motivate conduct, even if 
one can never know how it does so. One must act for the sake
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of the moral law, but one must never know that one is so acting. 
He writes at the conclusion of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic 
of Morals that:
“We do not comprehend the practical unconditioned necessity of 
the moral imperative, we do comprehend its 
incomprehensibility” (*10).
The problem with which Kant leaves his readers, is that df how 
reverence for a pure idea is to motivate action; and it is in this 
context that the theological relevance of Kant’s moral 
philosophy becomes most apparent. Kant thus interprets the 
scriptural injunction to love your enemies as a commandment to 
kindness done from duty, because ‘love out of inclination cannot 
be commanded’ (*11). For Kant, ethical love is ‘practical, not 
pathological ... residing in the will and not in the propensions of 
feeling’. Again, Kant’s insistence that morality must be derived 
from a priori reasoning and not from the study of examples leads 
him to assert that ‘even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be 
compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can 
recognise him to be such’ (*12). Thus Kant gestures towards a
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doctrine of grace (or of what he calls the ‘blessed will ) only via 
an acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the idea of duty as a 
moral motivation for conduct; and towards the Incarnation only 
as the symbol of a moral perfection which can otherwise be 
described in wholly secular terms.
Kant's moral philosophy is intellectually persuasive for the same 
reason that it is limited in its power of explanation. Kant 
expounds with great clarity the formal conditions which would 
have to be satisfied by free and rational conduct as he 
understands it. However, he cannot explain (as he freely 
acknowledges) how this conduct is possible. That limitation in 
Kant’s thought is the necessary consequence of its greatest 
strength: namely, that it refuses to conceive of ethics in either 
cultural or psychological terms. He seeks to replace those 
terms with a priori philosophical ones; when he is unable so to 
do he is forced to have recourse to a negative dialectic which is 
implicitly a negative theology: one which comprehends the 
incomprehensibility of human ethical life.
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Hegel’s critique of Kant shall now be examined. Hegel’s brief 
explicit discussion of Kant in The Positivity of the Christian 
Reiigion suggests that he sees Kant’s moral philosophy as a 
potential solution to the theological problem which he (Hegel), 
expounds. In that essay Hegel writes:
“The fundamental error at the bottom of a church’s entire system 
is that it ignores the rights pertaining to every faculty of the 
human mind, in particular to the chief of them, reason. Once the 
church’s system ignores reason, it can be nothing save a 
system which despises man. The powers of the human mind 
have a domain of their own, and this domain is separated off for 
science by Kant. This salutary separation has not been made by 
the church in its legislating activity” (PCR 143).
Yet, as Hegel’s subsequent exposition makes clear, the Kantian 
argument is ambiguous in its theological import. The very 
distinction which Kant makes between the necessary condition 
and the efficient cause of a moral act opens up a further 
theological difficulty. For Protestant theology does claim to be
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concerned with the real motivation of human action. Both 
Lutheran and Calvinist doctrines claim that believers can 
discern such motivation in themselves. The Kantian disjunction 
between the formal principle of action and its voluntary origin 
can, therefore, accentuate rather than overcome that opposition 
of spiritual to secular consciousness which Protestant 
Christianity seems to require:
“Reason sets up moral, necessary, and universally valid laws; 
Kant calls these objective' ;.. Now the problem is to make these 
laws subjective, to make them into maxims, to find motives for 
them; and the attempts to solve this problem are infinitely 
diverse ... The sole moral motive, respect for the moral law can 
be aroused only in a subject in whom the law is in itself the 
legislator, from whose own inner consciousness the law 
proceeds. But the Christian religion proclaims that the moral 
law is something outside us and something given, and thus it 
must strive to create respect for it in some other way” (PCR 143 
-144).
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In The Positivity of the Christian Religion, Hegel directly relates this 
problem, which is exactly the problem of human subjectivity as 
conceived by Hegel's early religious thought, to the philosophy 
of Kant. The problem, and the inadequacy of the Kantian 
standpoint as a response to it, derives from the destructively 
positive element in Christianity which Hegel perceives in the 
religious life of his time. That destructive element is precisely 
the belief that “the moral law is something outside us and 
something given”. In 1797 Hegel describes this as a belief which 
the Christian religion proclaims. He also implicitly criticises that 
belief, but at this stage he has no fully coherent conception of a 
Christianity free of the moral and intellectual heteronomy which 
he describes. Such a Christianity would certainly have some 
positive elements; but they would be a vehicle for, not an 
obstacle to, the free expression of inner commitment. At this 
stage, Hegel at most only hints at such a creative alternative to 
the impoverished Christian life of his time; he never delineates 
its real content. For the same reason, Hegel's appeal to Kantian 
thought has more a negative than a constructive function; it 
evokes the idea of a reconciliation between social and
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intellectual freedom and Christian commitment, but offers no 
means of bringing such reconciliation into being. Hegel defines 
the problem of human subjectivity in specifically theological 
terms:
“ ... the Christian church has taken the subjective element in 
reason and set it up as a rule as if it were something objective” 
(PCR 143).
For Hegel, at this stage, Kant adequately describes this situation 
but can offer no means of resolving it. Indeed, the effect of 
Kant’s philosophy on the consciousness of philosophically 
educated believers may well be to compound their sense of 
alienation. If we make Hegel’s implicit philosophical critique of 
Kant explicit, the problem with Kant’s categorical imperative is 
that it is a regulative ideal and not a constitutive truth. It points 
to the law of what ought to be, but offers no clue as to how the 
law is to be realized in experience. The incapacity of the Kantian 
framework to offer Hegel, at this stage, a satisfactory resolution 
of the theological crisis of his time derives especially from its 
failure to perceive any enabling role for positivity in religious
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life. The Kantian ethic, because of its self-confessed inability to 
describe the means to its own embodiment, leaves the false 
embodiment (the dead ritual and reified doctrine) of Christian 
faith in place. Indeed, that ethic also engenders an ‘unhappy 
consciousness’ which yearns for fulfilment in the ideal realm of 
the philosophical imagination. For that reason, the Kantian ethic 
runs the risk of becoming destructively positive itself: of setting 
up commandments which no one on Earth can fulfil and thus 
dividing the consciousness of humanity in two.
There is a parallel between Hegel’s critique of Judaism (and of 
the positive Christianity of his time which he sees as Judaism’s 
modern successor) and his critique of Kant. It is apparent, if 
only implicitly at this stage, that Hegel regards the Kantian 
scheme as inadequate to the task of responding to the problem 
of Protestantism and inwardness in the culture of his time. 
Pharisaic Judaism, according to Hegel, was destructively 
positive because its Sittlichkeit utterly excluded Moralitat Thus, 
its public practice was only an external and historical 
phenomenon. For Hegel then, in Judaism the socially embodied
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moral code was ‘positive’ because it was not the product of the 
self-conscious moral and intellectual life, or ‘subjectivity’, of the 
Jewish people. Counter to this, the Kantian ethic internalizes 
the positive by allowing Moralitat to eclipse Sittlichkeit. If Judaism 
neglects the sphere of human subjectivity entirely, Kantianism 
entirely neglects the context in which that subjectivity has to be 
made real. For Judaism, the cultural is the ethical: it is concrete, 
external, objective and historical. In Kantianism, the moral law 
has become abstracted from any social or cultural context and 
yet is absolute in its demands. Kant is a philosopher of human 
subjectivity par exce/Zence: a philosopher for whom human self- 
knowledge is the key to human freedom, and human freedom 
the key to ethical truth. Yet the problem for Kant’s disciples is 
precisely, in Hegel’s words, ‘to make the laws subjective’: to 
connect the formal imperative of the moral law to the 
particularity of their experience.
Through his engagement with Kant, Hegel comes to see that any 
mode of ethical thought which shuns cultural embodiment may 
be just as destructively ‘positive’ as one which uncritically
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accepts a particular cultural form. The problem is not whether, 
but how, human subjectivity is to be expressed in the cultural 
and religious traditions of humankind: how the inescapable 
positivity of human culture can enable, not threaten, the 
realization of human freedom. In the terms of Hegel's argument, 
the problem is one of how a living, and philosophically informed, 
Christian faith is to come to terms with the positive, historically 
real, forms of Christian belief. In the next section I will consider 
in more detail Hegel's understanding of the role of the Positive 
in Christian belief.
(iv) Positivity and Christianity
Hegel establishes that there is indeed a role in religion for the 
Positive, which he sees Jesus in the scriptures attempting to re­
establish amongst the Jews, in place of an abuse of the Positive 
which renders their religion idolatrous rather than moral. Hegel 
outlines what he considers to be two false understandings of 
positivity in the Christian theology of his time:
53
“Against this view that the teaching of Jesus is not Positive at 
all, that he did not wish to base anything on his authority, two 
parties raise their voices. They agree in maintaining that while 
the (Christian) religion of course contains principles of virtue it 
also contains positive prescriptions for acquiring God’s favour 
by exercising feelings and actions rather than by morality" (PCR 
71).
The two parties to which Hegel here refers are the ‘philosophical’ 
and the ‘positive’ (PCR 74 -  75). The philosophical’ party wishes 
to eliminate the positive element from Christianity altogether, 
replacing it with the a priori principles of pure reason. The 
‘positive’ party wants to replace unexamined doctrine and 
mechanical practice with the supposedly authentic positivity of 
the person and authority of Christ. These two positions, Hegel 
suggests (PCR 67f et seq.), are often taken by the philosophical 
enemies of Christianity as an appropriate target because they 
remove from Christian doctrine any determinate, and thus 
publicly articulable, content which could not be independently 
derived from natural reason. Hegel acknowledges that such a 
critique is objectively true of much religious practice, but argues
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that the critics are mistaken in taking a spiritually dead, because 
mechanistic, religious practice to be identical with any positively 
embodied form of Christian faith.
The Positive, according to Hegel, cannot be removed altogether 
from religion without the consequent ‘inwardness’ leading to a 
nihilistic solipsism. The extremism of the ‘philosophical’ and 
‘positive’ parties suggests to Hegel that:
“Between these two kinds of sects (philosophical and positive) 
we might place a third which accepts the Positive principle of 
faith in a knowledge of duty and God’s will, regarding it as 
sacred and making it a basis of faith but holds that it is the 
commands of virtue which are essential in the faith, not the 
practices it orders or the positive doctrine it enjoins or may 
entail ” (PCR 75).
A belief in an objective ethics outside the bounds of religion, 
perhaps one of the principles of which remain as yet unknown, 
is never ruled out, but Hegel is not at this stage primarily 
concerned with the secular world. He argues that, if the content
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of the perfect morality cannot as yet be identified, then the 
content of the positive must be chosen arbitrarily and there is, 
therefore, no rational foundation for actions based upon it. As 
an instance of the positivity of the Christian religion Hegel cites 
miracles (of which he had purged his own earlier account of the 
gospel stories in The Life of Jesus) or rather the belief in miracles 
by the credulous, as a token of the abuse of power and authority 
in the Christian Church:
“Nothing has contributed so much as these miracles to make the 
religion of Jesus positive; to basing the whole of it, even his 
teaching about virtue, on authority" (PCR 78).
Hegel cites other such instances of positivity in Christianity and 
compares the Christian religion with Judaism:
“ ...Just as the Jews made sacrifices, ceremonies and a 
compulsory faith into the essence of religion, so the Christians 
made its essence consist in lip-service, external actions, ihner- 
feelings and an historical faith" (PCR 79 et seq.).
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In Judaism, Sittlichkeit had all but extinguished Moralitat. In 
Christianity, any move to reform by revitalising the moral 
freedom, the Moralitat, of the hitherto subjected individual 
presents itself as a problem. The moral agency of individuals 
can be exercised only in their interrelations: there must be some 
real social and cultural content to the moral law. Whence is this 
content to come? Hegel describes the plight of an individual 
struggling to reconcile a new-found sense of moral choice with 
the loss of faith in a moral code which had hitherto never been 
questioned:
“ ... The source of morality has been wholly renounced by the 
man who has subjected himself to the law only when compelled 
by fear of his lord's punishment. Hence, when he is deprived of 
the theoretical faith in this power on which he is dependent, he 
is like an emancipated slave and knows no law at all. The law 
whose yoke he bore was not given by himself, by his reasons, 
since he could not regard his reason as free -  as a master -  but 
only as a servant”.
In a footnote to the same:
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“This is why the loss of a purely positive religion so often has 
immorality as its result. If the faith was a purely positive one 
then the responsibility for this result lies directly with the 
positive faith -  not with the loss of it" (PCR 80).
(v) Church and State
Hegel fully supports the condemnation (at the Reformation) of 
the Church for having become a political power in society, rather 
than a radical one in the gospel tradition, which cares for the 
poor and the outcasts of society. The Church had become the 
establishment rather than the establishment’s critic. The gospel 
teaching that all are equal before God has been rendered ‘all are 
equal before God, but not in this life’, and the sale by the Church 
of indulgences and the wealth of the mediaeval monasteries 
testify to this. However, Luther’s good intentions had not really 
borne fruit in the subsequent history of Protestantism. The ‘bad’ 
(because mechanical) Positivity once manifest in Church 
iconography and liturgy has been internalized in the submission
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of each member of the Church community to the law of his 
heart. Moreover, the Protestant churches have themselves 
become established in particular societies in just the same way 
as had the Catholic Church which they sought to replace. Hegel 
refers to Spanish Catholic missionaries in South America and to 
the Inquisition (both historically and in the present); and 
compares Catholic with Protestant, each in his respective 
practice of depriving the unconverted of their civil rights in the 
mistaken if sincere belief that it is his duty so to do. For Hegel, 
legal rights are the embodiment in law of rights which he 
believes go hand-in-hand with moral responsibility. Moral duties 
and legal rights balance one another:
“Justice depends on my respecting the rights of others; it is a 
virtue if I regard it as a duty and make it the maxim of my 
actions, not because the State so requires but simply because it 
is a duty and in that event is a requirement of the moral law not 
of the State" (PCR 96).
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Hegel considers this to be true irrespective of any particular 
religious tradition, but religion can engender an attitude of mind 
within the State which cannot be legislated for, but which may 
stimulate and accompany the making of rational and humane 
public law. The moral law completes the civil law, and vice 
versa.
For Hegel, one of the most important achievements of the 
French revolution was to establish the rights of free secular 
reason against the Roman Catholic Church, then very much a 
temporal power in its own right and allied to the secular power 
of the French monarchy. However, he is acutely conscious that 
he is writing in Lutheran Germany. Protestantism, unlike 
Catholicism, argues that there is an explicitly Christian rationale 
for the full participation of the believer in the secular state. For 
Protestant Germany, therefore, the problem for political theology 
derives from the proximity of church to state, not the distance 
between them. For Lutheran orthodoxy, as for Hegel, the 
difference between the Kingdom of Heaven and the kingdom of 
this world is one between two very distinct yet compatible 
attitudes which Christians are enjoined to adopt in relation to
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the whole of their experience. Luther's Christian freedom is 
entirely compatible with allegiance to the secular law, provided 
that that law guarantees freedom of religion.
The problem for Hegel’s political theology at this stage is that, in 
the Lutheran Germany of his day, pietistic theology construes 
the Church as a sect (or a plurality of sects) only accidentally 
related to the secular polity in which they exist (v. PCR 142 -  
145). However, Kantian moral philosophy prescribes 
universalisable principles of rational freedom. Those principles, 
even if they are compatible with membership of at least one 
such sect, cannot of themselves prescribe religious allegiance, 
nor mediate between any particular religious body and the state. 
The effect of this is that, in Hegel’s Germany, there is both a 
conflict between church and state, and a conflict between 
pietistic faith and secular reason. The conflict is all the more 
intense because secular and theological consciousnesses, in 
the Protestant world, do not have separate spheres of action; 
they compete for the sarne such sphere (*13).
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Hegel describes the consequences of this conflict in terms of 
the competing, and so mutually incompatible, loyalties of the 
modern Protestant individual:
“On the other hand, by entering the society of the positive 
Christian sect he has assumed the duty of obeying its statutes 
not because he has himself taken something for obligatory, 
good and useful, but because he has left the society to decide 
these matters and recognizes something as duty simply and 
solely at another’s demand and another’s judgement. He has 
accepted the duty of believing something and regarding it as 
true because the society has commanded belief in it whereas if I 
am convinced of a philosophical system I reserve the right to 
change my conviction if reason so requires’’ (PCR 100).
How, then, is this conflict to be resolved? The concluding 
section of The Positivity of the Christian Religion deals largely with 
Hegel’s own formulation of provisions to ensure that the 
relationship of church to state avoids any conflict of interests.
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However, Hegel’s argument at this stage is inadequate to the 
task. The state is to be entrusted with authority, and religion is 
to be the safeguard against any abuse of that authority. If there 
is to be no established church, no State religion (which, in the 
light of the Church’s role as guarantor of the State’s non-abuse 
of authority, must be taken as given), then the problem of 
‘inwardness’ in German Protestantism is accentuated rather than 
resolved. In the absence of a single State religion -  in the 
interests of freedom -  a plurality of religions (or of 
denominations within a single religion) might flourish, each one 
as legitimate as the other. If what constitutes the Positive, with 
regard to the content of the moral law, for one such religious 
group is indistinguishable from that of another, then what is 
there to choose between them? If otherwise, a conflict of 
interest between such groups, and a conflict about the basis for 
the role of the civil power as arbitrator, seems inevitable.
The notion of Volksreligion as the harmony of the social and the 
ethical is still the guiding influence in Hegel’s thinking here as 
he explores necessary and practicable relations between Church 
and State. However, the role of any spiritual sense -  which was
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even present, if perhaps somewhat understated, in his 
exposition of the exemplary Hellenic world -  has become even 
more vague in his account of religion in his ideal of modern 
society. Articles of faith are to be taken up by an individual on a 
contractual basis just as the protection granted to one under the 
laws of the State is conditional upon one's upholding them 
oneself: the social contract. The relationship of the individual to 
the internal or external Positive is the same.
In his reduction of religion to morality, Kant held the divine 
figure of Christ to be, in his moral perfection, a ‘regulative ideal’. 
The moral life of Jesus of Nazareth is the ideal towards which all 
individuals must strive. For Kant, however, the ideal is 
incommensurate with the reality of human experience, being a 
goal never to be attained. For Hegel, by contrast, the regulative 
ideal is anathema because Jesus, even for Lutheran theology, 
was not ‘man made God’, but ‘God made man’. The Incarnation 
means that the ‘imitation of Christ’ is a realizable, not an 
impossible, goal. Hegel defines the ‘task’ inherited from Luther 
thus:
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“ ... Great men have claimed that the fundamental meaning of 
Protestant is a man or a church which has not bound itself to 
certain unalterable standards of faith but which protests against 
all authority in matters of belief, against all engagements 
contradictory of that sacrosanct right” (PCR 128).
For Kant and Hegel alike, the rationality of the individual subject 
(the moral agent) is the key to that subject's freedom and hence 
to that subject’s moral responsibility. For Hegel, however, the 
antithetical structure of Kant’s ethical thought, the opposition it " 
construes between duty and inclination, between the universal 
law and every contingent source of motivation in the moral '
agent, means that it is necessarily incapable of realizing its own 
ideal. Hegel argues that the subordination of inclination to the 
Kantian law is itself positive and counter to the moral freedom 
which is the defining characteristic of Protestantism. The 
theological consequence of that structure is a religion of 
unfulfilled desire: one which uses the Bible to describe, indeed 
even to sanction, its own inability to realize its longing in the 
world. The giving of the law by God to Moses was an historical
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event, a happening in a particular place and at a particular time 
and so necessarily unchangeable. Its embodiment in the person 
of Christ is the unattainable ideal towards which it Is our duty to 
strive, conscious of its unattainability.
In Hegel's subsequent work, the theological critique of Kant 
already implicit in The Positivity of the Christian Re//g/on will 
become explicit and give rise to a decisive shift in Hegel’s own 
theology. For Hegel, the Revelation of the moral law must itself 
disclose the means by which humanity must make that law its 
own. The moral law cannot be made real in experience by 
rational introspection alone. The moral subject’s rational 
freedom must be realized through engagement with the ethical 
life of the community. What that engagement means, both 
theologically and ethically, and what its real cost is to be, will be 
amongst the most important themes of Hegel’s subsequent 
religious and ethical thought.
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THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY AND ITS FATE
(vi) Human Reason and Freedom
This text, The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, represents a 
significant new stage in the development of Hegel's theology. 
That is so, first, because Hegel for the first time seeks not just to 
describe but also to overcome the limitations of the Kantian 
position in relation to Christian theology; and, secondly, 
because Hegel develops a concept of Spirit which, albeit in very 
embryonic form, transcends the Kantian dualism and points 
towards the idea of historically embodied Spirit which informs 
Hegel’s mature philosophy of religion.
Hegel’s new and much more critical understanding of the 
significance of Kantian ethics is made clear by his comparison 
of the Kantian moral law within to the worship of an idol. Hegel 
recounts Kant’s likely condemnation of the Siberian Shaman for 
bowing down to worship an idol. The Shaman, Hegel points out, 
has his idol outside himself; but the Kantian self-legislator, 
whilst believing himself to be absolutely free, has his idol inside 
himself.
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“And between the Shaman ... on the one hand and the man 
who listens to his own command of duty on the other, the 
difference is not that the former make themselves slaves while 
the latter is free, but that the former have their lord outside 
themselves while the latter carries his lord in himself yet at the 
same time is his own slave” (SCF 266).
In The Spirit of Chhstianity and Its Fate, Hegel argues that the 
objective positivity of the Mosaic Law does not dictate the 
criteria of its own rationality; perhaps it cannot do so because it 
is not of itself innately rational. Instead it is the individual 
subject's duty to use his own rationality to appropriate that 
positive law in his moral beliefs and actions. Thus the law is 
merely symbolic of the God who revealed it rather than being 
that which has God revealed within it. God remained alienated 
from the Jews for all that he had revealed himself to Moses.
That Moses dies before the Jews entered the land of Israel is a 
pregnant and poignant reminder that the revelation to Moses as 
an historical event is long past. The Jews did not have God, but
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only the law as positive object. Such an object determines 
those subject to it rather than their, subject and object, being 
mutually defining. Moreover, the Jews as a community react 
against, or act in accordance with, that law in their struggle to 
comprehend that which they have been given rather than that 
which they themselves have made. Thus, for Hegel, the Spirit of 
Judaism is not the mutual interaction of subject individuals but 
rather the whole of Jewry acting, or reacting as if they, the 
community, were a single such subject. Even if we were to 
circumvent the problem of the reality of God’s revelation to 
Moses, by conceiving it as a metaphor by which those who set 
down the laws might ascribe divine authority to them, the 
fundamental belief in their having been so divinely revealed 
amounts to the same in the end. For aii the erudition and 
inspired interpretation of the subsequent commentaries on the 
law, the positive in Judaism is something static, and rational 
justification of its contents as opposed to rational 
understanding of its strictures remains irrelevant. If it were not 
for the plurality of its own positive doctrines -  and often their
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mutual exclusivity -  Christianity would be positive in just the 
same vein.
Hegel’s critique of the dualism of the Kantian ethic, which was 
implicit in his earlier work, is now completely explicit, and 
explicitly theological in form. In The Spirit of Christianity and Its 
Fate, Hegel characterizes the historical consequences in the life 
of the early Christian community of what he still sees as the self­
division inherited from Judaism and implicit in Christian belief. 
What is new in this text is that he describes that self-division in 
terms of the historical destiny of the Christian Church, and in so 
doing goes beyond the moral and psychological emphasis of his 
earlier work. That historical analysis shall now be examined.
(vii) The Second Coming and Christian History
For the Apostles, the person of Jesus had indeed been 
immediate, concrete and thus historical. After the Ascension, 
wherein Christ was removed from them before their very eyes, 
they were conscious not so much of the presence of God but of
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the absence of the Son of God. The eager anticipation amongst 
members of the early church of the imminent and historical 
return of Jesus Christ turned in time into a longing for 
something unattainable in this life. The Incarnation had marked 
the realization of God in Jesus. Jesus was not ‘all men’ but one 
man in particular, and the Ascension marked the particular 
subject’s return to that first object state whence it had come at a 
particular time and in a particular place. Even the ‘personal’ God 
of Protestant theology must be completely other if he, God, is to 
be a positive object for all. Even the early Christian church, 
then, to which Hegel accredits greatest authenticity, begins to 
replicate the very positivity of Judaism against which Jesus 
taught. The use of the word ‘kingdom’ as in ‘Kingdom of God’ in 
the church, Hegel suggests (SCF 278), implies domination. The 
language of lordship and bondage, however beneficent the 
dominant lord, reinforces the sense of estrangement between 
individuals, rather than the identification of each with the other. 
The Kingdom of God should be understood in terms of love 
rather than domination. Hegel writes, quoting again from Saint 
John:
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“ ‘A new command give I unto you,’ says Jesus, (John Ch 18 v34) 
‘ that ye love one another. Thereby shall men know that ye 
are my disciples.’ ... Is there an idea more beautiful than that of à 
nation of men related to one another by love? Is there one more 
uplifting than that of belonging to a whole, which as a whole, as 
one, is the Spirit of God whose sons the individual members 
are? ” (SCF 278).
The idea of the spirit of a community suggests something 
transient just as the community itself is transient. For Hegei, the 
spirit of Judaism was historically contingent because it was a 
product of history rather than the creator of its own history. The 
false subjectivity of a community acting ‘as a single subject’ 
made it prey to the contingencies of a certain time and a 
particular place; it could not be free.
In spite of the Gospel injunction, Hegel argues, the early 
Christians’ consciousness, not of the presence of God but only 
of ‘the absence of the Son of God’, was to all intents and 
purposes a similar idolization of a certain time and a particular
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place. This was both a denial of freedom and a consequent 
lapse into historical determinism which led to the belief that the 
primitive church was subject to a 'fate' superior to God. Hegel 
now sees the religion of unfulfilled desire not just as a 
psychological fact, but as a cultural reality in the life of the early 
church. It is the correlative in religious practice both of the 
disciples mourning (after the ascension of Christ) for the loss of 
their Lord, and the seeming vanity of their as yet unrewarded 
anticipation of the Kingdom. To be sure, Hegel’s account of the 
consequences of Pentecost is theologically heterodox in the 
extreme, because it construes the coming of the Spirit not as a 
token of the continued presence of the risen and ascended Lord, 
but as the source of an infinite longing (Sehnsucht) for the Lord 
who is absent. Yet Hegel’s theology in The Spirit of Christianity 
and Its Fate is a theology of Spirit indeed: a theology of 
Incarnation which describes the embodiment of ultimate truth in 
human experience and so in human history. This is a significant 
advance beyond Hegel’s position in The Positivity of the Christian 
Religion. Hegel had earlier construed the problem of Positivity 
and Inwardness as a self-division (in the minds of individual
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Christians) which had been intensified within some 
developments of the Lutheran tradition and, more specifically, 
by the legacy of Kant. He now sees it as a dialectic acted out in 
the history of Christianity itself.
In The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, Hegel argues that the 
historical tragedy of Christianity has its roots in the experience 
of the early Christians, indeed of the disciples themselves. The 
appearance of Christ had manifested a Real Presence indeed; 
and it is to this Presence that Hegel gives the name ‘Spirit’. The 
Ascension leads to a self-division within the life of Spirit itself: a 
divorce between the consciousness of the disciples, conscious 
of the absence of their Lord, and the Divine Spirit itself, which is 
the ground of that consciousness. The history of Christianity 
after the time of Christ is now, for Hegel, the history of the 
inevitably frustrated attempts of the Christian community to heal 
the rift: to bridge the gap between the positivity of the Christian 
religion, embodied in the institutions and practices of European 
Christendom, and the alienated consciousness which is the 
heart of that religion. At this stage in Hegel’s development, then.
74
the problem of positivity and inwardness is not, in the first 
place, one which derives from the intellectual climate of post- 
Kantian Germany, or indeed even from the Lutheran theological 
tradition as such. It is a problem, in Hegel’s understanding, 
inherent in the structure of Christian experience and in the 
whole history of Christianity since the apostolic age. To be 
sure, Hegel still understands that problem as taking a particular 
form, and a particular intensity in the religious and philosophical 
culture of his time and of his nation. He sees that culture now 
as the expression, not the cause, of a deeper and more universal 
malaise.
Hegel’s concept of the ‘Christian religion’ has also changed. In 
the title of Hegel’s essay The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, the 
word Christianity {Christentum) means both Christian faith and 
the objective reality of Christianity which is Christendom. In his 
later essay Hegel is not primarily concerned, as he was in The 
Positivity of the Christian Religion, with an analysis of the doctrinal 
content or the institutional forms of Christian belief, but with the 
whole historical life of the Christian tradition in its interaction
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with the secular world. There is thus a profound paradox in 
Hegel’s early concept of embodied Spirit. That concept implies, 
by definition, a concern with that historical objectivity and 
historical continuity of the Christian tradition which is eschewed 
by Lutheran theology and Kantian philosophy alike. Hegel’s 
application of that concept leads to the affirmation that the Truth 
of Christ can never be adequately embodied in the world, indeed 
that the real history of Christianity is necessarily one of 
mourning for the loss of that truth. In the title of his essay Hegel 
uses the word Christentum to mean at once both faith and 
history; but in his argument he affirms that faith and history can 
never be reconciled. In his title also he refers to the history of 
Christianity with a word -  Schicksal (Fate) -  which implies that 
that history is not a promise but a threat: that the Christian 
community is condemned to be both inextricably involved, and 
yet irrevocably at odds, with the surrounding secular world.
The paradox in Hegel’s concept of embodied Spirit gives rise to 
a new and, henceforth, fundamental tension in his critique of 
post-Kantian theology. Hegel’s theology is now the basis for his
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cultural and psychological critique of the inadequacies of the 
Kantian ethic; not the other way round. In his later essay he 
exposes not only the inner contradictions of the Kantian 
standpoint, but the source of those contradictions in a 
contradictory structure of experience. He shows that neither the 
Kantian philosophical position nor the Lutheran theological one 
is able to understand or even to articulate what the ‘problem’ of 
positivity and inwardness is; both positions are part of the very 
difficulty which they seek to transcend. But Hegel’s own 
position in this later essay is still inextricably linked to that same 
culture of alienated inwardness which he also seeks to enlighten 
and so to overcome.
I will now consider the manner in which Hegel’s concept of 
human subjectivity changed and developed from his position in 
The Positivity of the Christian Religion to that in The Spirit of 
Christianity and Its Fate. In the later work Hegel articulates human 
subjectivity as follows:
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“When Subjectivity is set against the Positive, service’s moral 
neutrality vanishes along with its limited character. Man 
confronts himself, his character, his deeds become the man 
himself. He has barriers only where he erects them himself and 
his virtues are determinacies which he fixes himself. This 
possibility of making a clear-cut opposition between virtue and 
vice is freedom in the ‘or’ of virtue or vice’’ (SCF 225).
For Hegel now, the relationship between human subjectivity and 
the positive forms of human ethical life, be they secular or 
religious, is not one of sheer opposition. On the contrary, he 
now sees the sphere of positivity as a potential expression of 
the self-conscious freedom and rationality of mankind. Man is 
indeed, as a social animal, dependent upon the community.
Even if in time he chooses to reject family and community, he is, 
until he is conscious of that choice, entirely dependent upon 
members of that family or community for the nurture necessary 
to his reaching any state of independence. After attaining such 
a state of consciousness within the community, he has become 
a moral agent exercising his moral agency in the choices he
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makes with regard to the consequences of this action (or 
neglect of action) for others in the community. His taking the 
values of the community and making them his own is not the 
same as his being determined by the community, for such a 
choice is his own self-determination and he is fully responsible 
for its consequences.
(vlii) Hegel’s Theology and the Need for Philosophy
The theme of moral agency, the equation of freedom with 
responsibility and the emphasized role of virtue are central to 
Hegel's overcoming the Kantian reduction of religion to morality. 
That which the law forbids must be forbidden because it is 
wrong, rather than that some action, intention or neglect of duty 
should be held to be wrong because it is forbidden. Man’s moral 
agency is real only for one conscious of his relation to 
community. To be truly conscious of one’s subjectivity then is 
to be conscious and self-conscious. Even one estranged from 
community can only be truly subjective if he is conscious of that 
estrangement. One who has not attained self-consciousness
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can only be determined by the world in which he lives, whereas 
the truly subjective agent can only be self-determining. Man’s 
growth in self-consciousness towards a fulness of Subjectivity 
in no sense marks a diminishment of Objectivity. The mutual 
definition of the consciousness of the ‘I am’ and the ‘that which I 
am not’ entails their growth together rather than the growth of 
either at the expense of the other. Hegel does not, at this stage, 
concern himself overmuch with the comparison of Subject to 
Object, but rather with the relationship between Subject and 
Object. Hegel anticipates in the language of morality and virtue, 
freedom and responsibility, the account of human subjectivity 
as set out more explicitly in The Phenomenology of Spirit. For all 
the changes in his conception of Spirit throughout the evolution 
of his philosophical system, the fundamental notion of Spirit as 
the relation of Subject to Object remains constant and begins 
here in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate. Hegel’s new concept 
of Spirit in this work thus has wide implications for both his 
epistemology and his social philosophy; but the roots of that 
new concept lie in his changed theological account of the 
problem of human subjectivity.
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For Hegel in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, the Spirit of 
Judaism lay in the false subjectivity of an entire people 
attempting to act as a single subject, conscious only of the 
existence of an objective world of which is predicated little 
because God was conceived as distant and not of this world. In 
Christianity, however, some degree of identity of the Subject 
with the World and with God -  everything which the subject 
perceives to be ‘other’ than himself -  is necessary in order to 
facilitate self-knowledge as the path to freedom. The Christian 
concept of God is for Hegel the most lucid means of articulating 
the relation of Subject to Object, God as Spirit. Furthermore, 
Christianity must overcome rather than replicate the slavish 
unquestioning obedience to Pharisaic legalism which he takes 
to be characteristic of the denial of the Subject’s subjectivity. If 
the Subject freely chooses to live in denial of his own freedom 
he condemns himself to being determined by the world around 
him, instead of taking steps to determine his own fate, his own 
history.
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In Hegel’s understanding of Judaism, God is not in the World. 
God’s objectivity lies in his being wholly ‘other’. The God who is 
‘a jealous God’ and who made Man, Adam, ‘in his own image, ‘is 
nonetheless wholly beyond human understanding and his 
commandments cannot be questioned. God determines the fate 
of the Children of Israel. God is indeterminate in as much as he 
remains invisible, unknown and ever distant. God determined 
the fate of the Jews in the pillar of cloud guiding the exiles out of 
Egypt and in speaking as the still small voice; but still he is not 
there. The idea of Jesus as Messiah was at least intelligible 
even if unacceptable; but the idea of Messiah as God incarnate 
in mere man, tangible and mortal, was incomprehensible. Hegel 
cites Saint John’s Gospel:
“He makes himself equal with God in that he calls God his 
Father’’ (John Ch 5 v18) and continues,
“In his opposition to Judaism he stood before their eyes only as 
an individual ...; continually appealed ... to his oneness with 
God who has granted to the son to have life in himself just as 
the Father has life in himself. He and the Father are one ... But
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Jesus calls himself not only Son of God; he is also the Son of 
Man” (SCF 261).
The Spirit of Christianity is distinct from that of Judaism in as 
much as it enables the Subject to realize his own subjectivity in 
relationship to other people, and with the objectivity which is 
God made tangible and mortal in the incarnation of God in Jesus 
and all men.
At the conclusion of The Early Theological Writings, then, Hegel 
leaves his readers with something of a paradox. He has arrived 
at a theological doctrine of embodied Spirit which offers a 
potential resolution of the problem of positivity and inwardness 
which is the principal concern of his early work. By redefining 
the problem of human subjectivity in terms of a Christian 
doctrine of Spirit, Hegel shows how the positive forms of human 
ethical life might potentially express rather than constrain that 
subjectivity. Whether they will do so depends upon the form 
which that ethical life takes; and at this point in his development 
Hegel still reads the whole history of post-apostolic Christianity 
as the story of the failure of its institutions and doctrines to offer
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humanity anything more than an alienated consciousness and 
experience of itself. For Hegel in 1800, that alienation is 
manifest in an irrevocable self-division in the consciousness of 
reflective Christians, who are conscious at once of their 
potential unity with God in the Spirit and of their actual distance 
from God in the life of alienated Spirit which is that of the 
Christian community on earth.
Hegel now understands this alienation as the source of that 
sense of unrequited longing which has characterized 
Christianity since Christ’s Ascension. The key theological 
problem he still has to resolve, therefore, is that of the historicity 
of God Incarnate. For orthodox Christian theology, the absence 
of God from the world was ended with the return of God as Spirit 
to the disciples at Pentecost. However, that return is neither 
historically nor philosophically real in the culture of Hegel’s time. 
It is unreal because of the theological and philosophical culture 
to which Hegel belongs and which his early essays both criticize 
and expound. With the writing of The Spirit of Christianity and Its 
Fate in 1800, however, Hegel has reached a turning point.
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Henceforth, he comes to see philosophy not only as the source 
of the self-division in the life of his time, but as the means of its 
resolution. He sees the task of his philosophy as being to make 
the idea of Spirit both fully intelligible and fully present in the 
consciousness of his age. Philosophy is to be the means by 
which the divided self is healed and the eternal longing is 
fulfilled.
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Chapter II
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
This chapter shall deal with Hegel’s 1827 Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. It shall be shown that the existential 
problem which Hegel outlines in exclusively theological terms at 
the close of The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate (1800) is further 
developed and then resolved philosophically in these lectures. 
This resolution is achieved to some degree in the light of 
developments explored in texts written in the intervening years.
The existential problem is, for example, re-formulated in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) in philosophical rather than 
theological terms, and the relationship between philosophy and 
religion is examined at length in Hegel’s essay Faith and 
Knowledge (1802). However, dealing with these texts in any 
depth is not the central task of this chapter, and only the Faith 
and Knowledge essay shall be dealt with at all in the exposition of
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the transition in Hegel’s thinking between the Early Theological 
Writings and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
(I) Faith and Knowledge
During the period between his writing The Spirit of Christianity and 
Its Fate and then Faith and Knowledge, Hegel’s religious thought 
underwent a decisive transformation. The key development is in 
Hegel’s concept of philosophical thought and its relevance to 
theology.
In the Early Theological Writings Hegel regards philosophy in the 
same light as art: that is, as being finite. This finitude lies in 
philosophy and art being, respectively, manifestations of the 
sum of the philosopher’s and of the artist’s experiences: 
expressions of a finite totality in a particular place at a particular 
time; the articulation of the historical and the contingent (*1). At
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this stage, Hegel argues in truly Kantian vein that philosophy 
can furnish knowledge only of the finite. Religion (in its Ideal 
rather than its Positive form), on the contrary, aspires through 
the mystical to go beyond the bounds of reason and to 
transcend the historical and the contingent. However, the fate of 
Christianity has been to follow the Positive, leaving the Ideal to 
philosophy.
In The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate Hegel had developed a 
concept of Spirit as historically embodied truth. However, his 
account of that truth in terms of an analysis of the primitive 
Christian community concluded that the Christian Spirit was 
condemned eternally to long for satisfaction beyond the real 
historical world. By the time he wrote Faith and Knowledge in 
1802, Hegel had moved on from an implicit adherence to this 
theological position to a diagnosis of its cultural origins in the 
philosophical and theological thought of his time.
Hegel's antipathy towards Catholicism did nothing to undermine 
the high regard in which he held mediaeval theology; indeed, he
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valued it even above the Protestant theology of his 
contemporaries (LPR 78f). Mediaeval theology and philosophy 
both accommodated and complemented one another in their 
common task of analysing and illuminating human experience 
and the will and nature of the divine. Hegel argues that, rather 
than having eliminated the Positive in contemporary Protestant 
Christianity, German Protestant theologians had opened religion 
to the criticism from philosophers that it was rationally 
untenable. In Hegel's view, Kant had signally failed to bridge the 
ever widening gulf between religion and philosophy, precisely 
because he endorsed rather than condemned the Positive.
In the essay Faith and Knowledge, Hegel writes:
“ ... The beautiful subjectivity of Protestantism is transformed 
into empirical subjectivity. The poetry of Protestant grief that 
scorns all reconciliation with empirical existence is transformed 
to the prose of satisfaction with the finite and of good 
conscience about it" (FK 61).
89
Just as philosophy, especially Hegel’s own, had identified the 
existential problem of Protestantism and Inwardness, so it must 
be philosophy which shall complete religion in its pursuit of the 
infinite and not religion which shall complete philosophy. 
Religion, as distinct from theology, has become a moment of 
philosophy, for philosophy must encompass all in its infinitude 
whilst religion, Protestant Christianity as the church-in-waiting, 
caught in the eternal if beautiful longing for the second coming 
of Christ, can only be a finite thing. The Church has made itself 
finite, determined its own fate thus and can strive again for the 
infinite only through philosophy.
Hegel has moved away from an immanent description, which is 
directly rooted in an engagement with The New Testament, of 
the consequences of post-Kantian Protestant theology. He has 
moved towards an attempt to understand the reasons why that 
theology has historically arisen and how its apparently 
destructive consequences can be understood and so potentially 
overcome. In this new project, philosophy has an important role 
to play in two respects. First, Hegel is concerned not only with 
Protestant theology but with what he calls ‘the reflective
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philosophy of subjectivity’ (*2): the whole intellectual movement 
of post-Kantian philosophy, which he sees as underpinning the 
modern Protestant theology of his time. In analyzing that 
philosophy, Hegel is also criticising it and pointing to a way 
beyond it. Hegel now sees the theological dilemma of his time 
not (as he had done in The Positivity of the Christian Religion) as a 
consequence of the application of post-Kantian critical 
philosophy to Christian theology, nor (as he had done in the 
Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate) as the inevitable fate of post- 
apostolic Christianity. He now analyses that dilemma by 
describing the intellectual life of his time in terms of the central 
categories of Christian theology: the Fall, the Incarnation, the 
Passion and Redemption. In Faith and Knowledge, the embryonic 
concept of Spirit which Hegel had developed in The Spirit of 
Christianity and Its Fate is brought within the compass of 
orthodox Christian theology. In his subsequent religious 
thinking, Hegel’s articulation of the concept of Spirit will become 
both more philosophical and more closely related to that 
theology. Secondly, and even more importantly for his 
subsequent development, he affirms for the first time that
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philosophy is the sole means of resolving the theological 
antinomies of his time. In an essay published in 1801, The 
Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy, 
Hegel stated that the self-division {Entzweiung) in the experience 
of his time is at the root of the need {Beddrfnis) for philosophy, 
and that only speculative philosophy in the Hegelian sense can 
meet that need. In Faith and Knowledge he argues that theology 
is a necessarily philosophical enterprise and that philosophy is 
a means of rescuing Christian intellectual integrity from the self­
divided modes of Christian belief which threaten that integrity 
(*3).
Indeed, Hegel now sees philosophy as an integral part of 
Christian experience. In another essay, published in 1802, On 
the Essence of Philosophical Criticism, Hegel writes of philosophy 
as an activity made necessary by the Fall itself: the self-division 
in all human experience brought about by the emergence of 
human self-consciousness (*4). For Hegel, philosophy is both 
the consequence and the redemption of this condition of self­
division. At the end of the Faith and Knowledge essay (FK 190 -
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191 etseq.) Hegel alludes to Pascal’s dictum that ‘Nature is such 
that it signifies everywhere a lost God both within and outside 
man’ (*5). This apprehension, which Hegel links to the words of 
the Lutheran chorale God himself is dead’, he connects also 
with startling directness to the task of philosophical thought. 
Philosophy, Hegel states, must enact a 'speculative Good Friday 
which represents for speculative thought the spiritual 
development articulated in narrative form by the Gospel stories 
of the Passion. The problem now, it would seem, lies not in the 
nature of the difference between philosophy and religion as 
discourses upon human experience, but in their indissoluble 
connection as modes of human experience. The two focal 
points of the Christian narrative, the Fall and the Passion, to 
which Hegel alludes in his essays of 1802 are taken up again, in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion and elsewhere in his mature 
philosophical system. Hegel’s developing understanding of 
both theological doctrines in relation to the task of philosophy is 
to be examined in more detail later in this chapter.
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As he sees philosophy as the most self-conscious form of 
human knowledge, Hegel, in the Faith and Knowledge essay, 
gives to philosophy the principal role in healing the self-division 
which he deems to be so characteristic of his age. He maintains 
that the key theological antinomies of his time -  those between 
faith and reason; God and history; the Kantian good will and the 
means of its realization -  have arisen because the time in which 
he is writing is, above all, an age of self-consciousness: one in 
which people reflect upon the relevance of human subjectivity to 
every sphere of thought and experience. Hegel differs 
profoundly from his Romantic contemporaries in his belief that 
the division brought about by this process of reflection can be 
healed only by a more adequate mode of reflection, not by a 
retreat into an illusory prelapsarian state of naïve immediacy. 
Philosophy, Hegel argues, is the most appropriate way forward 
because it reveals the significance of the emergence of self- 
consciousness itself, and describes that emergence as essential 
to the Christian understanding of truth. Philosophy can reveal, 
for example, why the critical philosophy of Kant is a necessary 
consequence of the Protestant Spirit in religion. It can reveal
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why two of the most influential philosophies of Hegel’s time, the 
critical rationalism of Kant and the intuitionism of Jacobi, are 
part of the same intellectual movement, even if their explicit 
discourses are opposed.
In the Faith and Knowledge essay, however, Hegel’s idea of the 
relevance of philosophy to the problems of his time is defined 
only in relation to the particular thinkers with which the essay 
deals. That idea is only defined substantively in his mature 
philosophical system, which is itself only fully developed some 
twenty years later; it is with this that the next part of this chapter 
shall be chiefly concerned.
(II) The Philosophy of Spirit
The key to Hegel’s mature understanding of the significance of 
philosophical thought is his doctrine of Spirit, which is 
expounded in the third part of his Encyclopaedia known as The 
Philosophy of Spirit (*6). In Hegel’s later system the concept of 
Spirit denotes a principle of knowledge. It means both the truth
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as it is embodied in all reality, and that which enables us to 
know that truth. For Hegel, both philosophy and religion are 
modes of Absolute Spirit. This means that both are concerned 
not with any particular and limited sphere of experience, but 
with the whole truth of experience. The difference between 
philosophy and religion consists not in their object, which is, in 
both cases, God, but in their mode of consciousness of that 
object: for philosophy, the explicit concept, Hegel's Begriff(PW\ 
302f paras 572 -  573; cf LPR 77 -  80, 144f); for religion, the 
necessarily partially inarticulable form of knowledge (Vorstellung) 
which Hegel calls representation, or picture-idea (PM 299, para 
565). The theological content of Hegel's concept of Absolute 
Spirit lies in the relationship it establishes between philosophy 
and religion as modes of absolute knowledge. That relationship, 
as it is expounded in the final section of The Philosophy of Spirit 
which is entitled Absolute Spirit, shall now be considered.
Fundamental to Hegel’s argument in this section of the 
Encyclopaedia is his affirmation that Absolute Spirit is God.
Thus Absolute Spirit is neither just an epistemological principle.
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nor merely an idea which is to be understood in regulative or 
analogical terms, but the name Hegel gives to the Reality which 
in religious worship is called God. It follows that philosophy for 
Hegel is an activity which is intrinsically religious in kind, 
whether or not it is concerned with a specifically theological 
subject matter. Hegel does indeed (LPR 79) describe philosophy 
as a mode of worship (Gottesdienst). Philosophy is also, for 
Hegel, an absolutely presuppositionless mode of thought. In the 
concluding section of The Philosophy of Spirit Hegel is concerned 
with what enables philosophy to have presuppositionless 
knowledge: what Hegel calls ‘Absolute Knowledge', and with the 
implications of that possibility for the relationship between 
philosophy and religion.
Hegel emphasises that ‘Belief and faith are not opposite to 
consciousness or knowledge’, and writes of Absolute Spirit:
“Religion, as this supreme sphere may be designated, ... must 
no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the Absolute
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Spirit which, as Spirit, is in its community ... God must be 
apprehended as Spirit in his community” (PM 292, para. 554).
God as infinite and Absolute Spirit is the presuppositionless 
consciousness. Its presuppositionlessness lies in its being self- 
conscious; the infinite absolute knowing itself. The Spirit that is 
religion is a part of the Absolute Spirit that is its Object, God.
“To know what God as Spirit is -  to apprehend this accurately 
and distinctly in thoughts -  requires careful and thorough 
speculation. It includes, in its forefront, the propositions: God is 
God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is, 
further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of 
God, which proceeds to man’s self-knowledge in God” (PM 298).
Thus, Hegel’s doctrine of Absolute Spirit, which is at once 
philosophical and religious, means that absolute knowledge, 
knowledge without presuppositions, is not knowledge without a 
real context in human experience. It is the most adequate mode 
of human consciousness of the truth, which is made possible by
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what Truth itself/s: the self-disclosure of the self-knowing Spirit 
of God.
(ill) Mediation and Spirit
Hegel’s mature doctrine of Spirit represents a decisive advance 
beyond his position in Faith and Knowledge due to its account 
of the manner in which philosophy mediates religious truth. For 
Hegel, philosophy is distinguished as a specifically conceptual 
and absolutely self-reflective mode of knowledge. Philosophy is 
about mediation; it is able to abstract from the immediacy of 
every particular mode of consciousness and to show that what 
appears to be an immediate manifestation of truth implies the 
mediation of the conscious subject. It follows that philosophy is 
able to give to religious faith, which is mediated not by 
conceptual reflection but by pictorial representation, a form of 
knowledge about itself to which faith, as faith, could not attain. 
However, this does not mean that philosophy is necessarily at 
odds with religion, or indeed even separable from it.
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Hegel describes the object of philosophical knowledge, and the 
means by which that object can be known, both in philosophical 
syllogisms as the absolute self-mediation of Spirit and in 
theological terms as the life of the Trinity. He characterises both 
the difference and the connection between God and mankind's 
consciousness of God in terms of a doctrine of self-mediating 
Spirit which is also a doctrine of how philosophy is made 
possible by the self-consciousness of God:
“These three syllogisms, constituting the one syllogism of the 
absolute self-mediation of spirit, are the revelation of that spirit 
whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial 
thought. From this its separation into parts, with a temporal and 
external sequence, the unfolding of the mediation contracts 
itself in the result -  where the spirit closes in unity with itself -  
not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling, but 
even to thought. In the immanent simplicity of thought the 
unfolding still has its expansion, yet is all the while known as an 
indivisible coherence of the universal, simple, and eternal spirit 
in itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of philosophy" 
(PM 301, para. 571 et seq.).
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Hegel’s account of the connection between philosophy and 
religion as modes of Absolute Spirit thus has two major 
consequences. First, philosophy is able to give to religion a 
form of self-conscious insight which religion as such could not 
achieve, but which has a directly religious relevance. Secondly, 
philosophy is able adequately to understand itself only by 
understanding its own activity as part of the religious reality of 
Spirit. It follows, then, that the reality of absolute spirit, which 
makes philosophy possible as an absolutely presuppositionless 
mode of knowledge, also enjoins philosophy to acknowledge its 
religious basis. Hegel characterises a philosophy of absolute 
knowledge which refuses to acknowledge its religious basis as a 
destructive irony which is empty and vain:
“If the result -  the realised Spirit in which all mediation has 
superceded itself -  is taken in a merely formal, contentless 
sense, so that the spirit is not also at the same time known as 
implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding -  then that 
infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness, 
knowing itself in itself as absolute -  Irony. Irony, which can
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make every objective reality naught and vain, is itself the 
emptiness and vanity, which from itself, and therefore by chance 
and its own good pleasure, gives itself direction and content, 
remains master over it, is not bound by it -  and, with the 
assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and 
philosophy, falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness" (PM 
301 para 571).
The paradox here is that it is precisely the presuppositionless 
character of speculative reason which Hegel describes in 
theological terms. He accounts in terms of a doctrine of the self­
mediation of Spirit for the possibility of philosophy’s being a 
self-conscious mode of knowledge. It is possible to describe 
that doctrine only in terms of the categories of philosophical 
speculation. However, Hegel’s point is that to do so is to 
describe any capacity for absolute knowledge in terms which 
ignore the full human relevance of that capacity. Hegel uses the 
language of theology and writes of absolute knowledge as 
knowledge of God, not because he wants to give a theological 
aura to an entirely secular argument, but because he wants to
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draw attention to the imbalance which is entailed by formulating 
his argument in entirely secular terms. That his argument could 
without logical inconsistency be so formulated is clear, but so to 
argue in secular terms would be to do exactly that of which 
Kierkegaard accuses Hegel: to read a system as if it 
encompassed everything except the contingent existence of the 
person who thinks through and seeks to understand it (*7). In 
the language of John Henry Newman, it would be to give 
notional but not real assent to Hegel's doctrine of absolute Spirit 
(*8). Yet Hegel’s own characterization of a possible, and entirely 
coherent, response to his philosophy as “empty and vain” shows 
that he is aware of the force of the charge. It is for that very 
reason that Hegel’s speculative doctrine of Absolute Spirit 
points towards what Emil Fackenheim suggests is an implicit 
doctrine of religious assent (*9). Underlying Hegel’s speculative 
doctrine there is an implied existential doctrine about what 
should be the appropriate response of the Hegelian thinker to 
the truth which the philosophy of absolute knowledge discloses.
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In The Philosophy of Spirit, then, Hegel gives explicit content to 
the project of speculative philosophy as a solution to the 
problems of post-Kantian theology, which he had first 
propounded in the Faith and Knowledge essay some twenty-five 
years before. His argument in The Philosophy of Spirit is germane 
to the question of the religious relevance of human subjectivity 
and the associated problem of inwardness and positivity, which 
were the central focus of his Early Theological Writings. Through 
his doctrine of Spirit, Hegel redefines the problem of human 
subjectivity as one concerning the relationship of human self- 
consciousness to the self-consciousness of God. He describes 
the emergence of human self-consciousness as a necessary 
moment in the life of the Divine Spirit, and in so doing offers an 
implicit response to the conflict between pietism and rationalism 
in the culture of his time. He shows how the most self-reflective 
mode of human knowledge, philosophy, can be understood as 
made possible by the self-manifestation of God; and how the 
apparently immediate certainty of pietism can be understood 
only as the product of a mediation in the mind of the believer.
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The key problem of Hegel’s Early Theological Writings, that of 
positivity and inwardness, was a problem predicated upon a 
theological dualism: how a living Christian faith is to affirm itself 
against the dead weight of positive doctrine, without falling into 
rationalistic abstraction or the empty intensity of pietism. 
Positive doctrine was on one side, human self-consciousness 
on the other. In The Philosophy of Spirit, a problem of dualism 
has been replaced by a problem of relationship: how is human 
self-consciousness, which is both human consciousness of God 
and God’s self-disclosure to humanity, to be understood? 
Hegel’s mature doctrine of Spirit means that pietism and 
rationalism, inwardness and positivity, are all modes of human 
self-consciousness, and thus implicitly connected to the 
interpretation of human self-consciousness which Hegel now 
understands as the task of philosophy. Even in this most 
speculative of Hegel’s treatments of theological problems, the 
existential origin of his philosophical theology is neither ignored 
nor reductively explained. In The Philosophy of Religion, Hegel 
addresses more directly the perceived tension between, on the 
one hand, the relevance of speculative philosophy to the
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theological needs of his time and, on the other, the difference 
apparent between philosophical speculation and Christian 
experience.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
(Iv) Hegel’s Critique of Contemporary Christian Theology
Hegel’s argument about Absolute Spirit is obviously relevant to 
German philosophical theology in the aftermath of the Kantian 
critique. I shall here attempt to find whether or not it is also , 
relevant to the cultural and existential malaise of modern 
Protestantism which Hegel so powerfully exposes in his Early 
Theological Writings. In order to demonstrate such a relevance, 
Hegel must make it clear that his doctrine of Embodied Spirit is 
about the Christ of history and the Christian experience of the 
modern believer, and also concerned with a particular set of 
problems in philosophical theology. Hegel attempts to do this in 
a work which is concerned with both the ontology of Spirit and 
the reality of Christian experience. That work (much of which
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was written without any intent to publish, and only 
reconstructed later from the lecture notes of some of Hegel’s 
students) is a compilation of lectures of 1827, On the Philosophy 
of Religion, in which much of his mature philosophy of religion is 
articulated and which shall now be examined in some detail.
The first part of this work consists in Hegel’s exposition of ‘the 
Concept of Religion’ as a particular mode of human 
consciousness of absolute spirit, and a critique of contemporary 
German philosophical theology which is more detailed than the 
one which he had already sketched in outline in the Faith and 
Knowledge essay. The second part is an overtly theological and 
indeed Christological discourse which deals directly with many 
of the existential problems initially broached in The Early 
Theological Writings. The remaining sections of this chapter shall 
deal with each part of Hegel’s argument in turn and examine the 
relationship between them.
Hegel begins the Preface of his Introduction to the Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion by setting an agenda:
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“What we must take into consideration is first, the relation of the 
philosophy of religion to philosophy as a whole and second, the 
relationship of the science of religion to the needs of our time" 
(LPR 75).
The first of these considerations, the relation of the philosophy 
of religion to philosophy as a whole, has already been examined, 
The second, the relationship of the ‘science of religion' to the 
‘needs of our time' (*10) is -  in expository terms -  more 
problematic. ^
Hegel’s characterization of ‘the needs of our time’, which in his 
view constituted the crisis in contemporary (and especially in 
German) theology, refer not only to the existential problem 
already discussed at some length, but also to at least four other 
trends in theological thought, all of which he saw as further 
compounding rather than alleviating that crisis.
I have already dealt with Kant’s reduction of religion to morality 
and stressed its inadequacy as a resolution of the problem of 
positivity in the Christian context. Another of the four
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theological schools of thought to which Hegel took exception 
not only predates Kant but is best illustrated in the work of 
Kant's own teacher, Christian Wolff, whose attempt to champion 
Pietistic thought resulted in his Rational Theology, which sought 
to prove the existence of God whilst already presuming that 
existence as a given. Here, God as the object -  Gegenstand -  \s 
for Hegel so far removed from the individual believer as to 
undermine that central tenet of Lutheran theology, the personal 
relationship between the believer and God. Thirdly, there is 
Historical Theology which, because of its complete lack of 
concern with the study of God and the divine, is in Hegel’s 
understanding not a theology at all. It is rather an anthropology 
of religion from an historical perspective and therefore 
concerned solely with the role of religion in the social fabric of 
communities. Fourthly, there is the Intuitionist Theology of 
Jacobi and Schleiermacher, which claimed that a type of quasi- 
mystical relation between God and the individual was 
philosophically tenable. For Kant, as has already been seen, 
God -  like freedom -  is a regulative idea or ideal. Such ideals 
are objective because universal in their validity, rather than
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merely subjective, as ideals in the minds of particular 
individuals are. The idea of God is perfect and complete. 
However, an individual's understanding of such an idea is partial 
and his rational faculty for appropriating such a regulative ideal 
may be imperfect and variable. Kant’s God, God as idea, is a 
means to an end rather than an end in itself; that end being 
morality. The implicit unattainability of the regulative ideal 
Hegel interprets as a denial of the humanity of God: a humanity 
which is essential to the doctrine of the Incarnation. By 
contrast, God for Jacobi and Schleiermacher is not a ‘Platonic 
idea’ but a reality which can be experienced directly through 
feeling. Jacobi’s ‘intuitionism’ was anti-rationalist, a defence 
against the pantheism and determinism which he regarded as 
consequential upon Kantian rationalism.
Hegel sums up the Jacobian/Schleiermacherian position thus:
“ ...The conviction of the age (is) that God is revealed 
immediately in the consciousness of human beings, ...The 
human being knows God immediately. This immediate knowing 
is called religion”’ (LPR 86).
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A faith in the immediate certainty of God felt and intuited is 
apparently self-justifying. Hegel seeks to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of such a position in its own terms, those of 
mediation and immediacy.
Hegel’s critique of all these theological positions (LPR 85ff), 
whether rationalist or pietistic in kind, demonstrates that their 
emphasis on either the intellectual inaccessibility or the 
immediate intuitive apprehension of God is the product of a form 
of mediation, the relationship of human self-consciousness to 
God, which neither standpoint, on its own terms, can 
acknowledge or understand. The chapter shall now deal with 
Hegel’s own Christian theology as set forth later in The 
Philosophy of Religion, in which his attempt to overcome the 
theological dilemma of his age is most fully expounded.
The most significant passages in Hegel’s account of Christianity 
are those which treat the Fall and the Incarnation. In these 
passages Hegel relates to his mature philosophical theology two 
concerns which have dominated his thought since the concerns 
which were the subject matter of the Early Theological Whtings:
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the self-division in human experience which is brought about by 
self-conscious knowledge, especially philosophy; and the 
difference as well as the relationship between the philosophical 
and the religious mode of truth, between concept and 
representation. In The Philosophy of Religion, Hegel discusses 
both of these issues in terms of the central problem of this 
thesis: the relationship between human subjectivity -  the self- 
conscious experience of humanity -  and the absolute truth 
which is absolute Spirit or God.
Hegel describes religious knowledge as a form of non- 
conceptual knowledge {Vorstellung) or representation (LPR 144f 
etseq.). From a Religious standpoint this means that there is a 
necessary gap between the subject who is conscious of 
religious truth and that truth itself, which Hegel calls the object 
of religion. Religion qua religion, must thus be a mode of 
consciousness of God which is not fully self-conscious. This 
religious consciousness commonly expresses itself through 
images, artefacts and sacred rituals in which the Divine is seen 
to be embodied, whilst the mode of that embodiment is not yet
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fully transparent to conceptual thought. Hegel's point, however, 
is that even for the philosophically unreflective religious 
consciousness there is a mediation (Vermittlung) and thus a 
conscious relationship in the consciousness of the believer (cf. 
LPR 133 -  137). Thus it follows that religious knowledge can 
never be wholly inarticulable or wholly limited to the private 
experience of the believer. A religious representation is thus 
potentially universal because representation must be an object 
for consciousness, and consciousness is capable of universal 
communication.
Hegel's idea of the relation of philosophy to religion comes to 
fruition in his account of the relation of representation to 
concept. Religion is not God, nor is it even an immediate 
apprehension of God, although religion may well encompass 
such an apprehension. Religion cannot be the immediate 
knowledge of God for it is rather the mediation of God as 
absolute spirit. Religion does not differ from philosophy 
because religion is immediate and philosophy is mediated 
knowledge of God. On the contrary: both philosophy and
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religion, as modes of absolute Spirit, are ways in which the 
Divine Spirit is mediated by the self-consciousness of humanity. 
The difference between religion and philosophy lies in the 
manner in which that mediation takes place. Religion is the 
representation, the 'Vorstellung’ of Go6, of absolute spirit; it is 
thus necessarily a consciousness of God as opaque to 
conceptual thought and yet intimately present in the 
consciousness of the believer. Philosophy is the concept, the 
'Begriff’ of God, of Absolute Spirit; it is thus necessarily a 
consciousness of God's being fully present as the object of 
conceptual thought, even if such thought does not exhaust the 
experience of the philosophically reflective believer.
(v) The Fall: Immediacy, Representation and Mediation.
Hegel relates this argument about the role of mediation to an 
examination of the doctrine of thé Fall. For Hegel, the story of 
the Fall is significant as much for its form as for its content. He 
begins his account by drawing attention to the fact that the 
biblical doctrine is first articulated precisely as a contingent
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event. The form of the biblical narrative thus raises the problem 
of representation (Vorstellung) and mediation (Vermittlung) which 
Hegel has earlier explored in his account of Jacobi and 
Schleiermacher. What does it mean that the Fall has happened, 
and what is the significance of that happening for the self- 
conscious mind which seeks to interpret and to make its own 
the biblical account?
“ ... It is the familiar story in Genesis. The gist of it is that God 
created human beings in his own image: this is the concept of 
the human being. Humankind lived in Paradise; we can call it a 
zoological garden. This life is called the state of innocence” 
(LPR 442 -  443 et seq.).
The point of Hegel’s apparently ironic interjection is not that the 
narrative contingency of the biblical story is irrelevant to the 
inner truth of the doctrine. It is rather that the very form of the 
narrative implies a disjunction between that form and its 
interpretation. Even if we believe that Eve really offered, and 
Adam really ate, the apple, it is neither the offering nor the
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eating which is wrong, but the transgression of God’s 
commandment. But the commandment, if it is to be real, has to 
take a contingent and determinate form.
“The story says, too, that the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil stood in Paradise, and that human beings disobeyed God’s 
command by eating of it. On the one hand, it is formally set 
down that this eating was the transgression of a commandment. 
The content, however, is the essential thing, namely, that the sin 
consisted in having eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil, and in this connection there comes about the pretence of 
the serpent that humanity will be like God when it has the 
knowledge of good and evil.”
Hegel now considers the meaning of the commandment and its 
transgression. His interpretation might appear to issue in a 
paradox: that it is consciousness of good and evil which is the 
source of evil itself. Yet this consciousness is what is 
specifically human, without which there could be no human 
history.
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“It is said, then, that human beings have eaten of this tree. It is 
clear, as far as the content is concerned, that the fruit is an 
outward image -  it belongs only to the sensible portrayal. What 
it really means is that humanity has elevated itself to the 
knowledge of good and evil; and this cognition, this distinction, 
is the source of evil, is evil itself. Being evil is located in the act 
of cognition, in consciousness. ... cognition is the source of 
evil. For cognition or consciousness means in general a judging 
or dividing, a self-distinguishing within oneself [LPR 443].
In his exegesis Hegel is thus, at least on this point, theologically 
orthodox. He reads the biblical record to mean that the activity 
of self-conscious thought -  precisely that “judging or dividing, a 
self-distinguishing within oneself which he elsewhere defines 
as the specific activity of philosophy (cf PM 301, para. 571) -  is 
the source of human pride and thus of evil. How then can we 
reconcile Hegel's theological orthodoxy with his devotion to 
philosophical thought in precisely this sense, indeed with his 
hostility to any form of theology which abjures self-reflective 
knowledge? A clue is to be found in Hegel’s interpretation of the
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subsequent part of the biblical narrative. The serpent, Hegel 
argues, does not lie, because God himself confirms its words:
“The story reports that an alien creature, the serpent, seduced 
humanity by the pretence that, if one knows how to distinguish 
good and evil, one will become like God. In this way the story 
represents the fact that humanity’s deed springs from the evil 
principle. However, the confirmation of the fact that the 
knowledge of good and evil belongs to the divinity of humanity 
is placed on the lips of God himself. God himself says ‘Behold, 
Adam has become like one of us’ (Gen. 3:22). So the words of 
the serpent were no deception. This is customarily overlooked 
along the lines of the ingrained prejudice to the effect that this is 
an irony of God; that God has made a joke” (LPR 444) (*11).
Hegel’s reading means that the serpent is only apparently alien 
to humanity, whilst God’s words are real. The irony is made 
apparent when one considers those Christian believers who are 
unable to acknowledge or to understand the relevance of God’s 
confirmation of human freedom. For Hegel, the Fall is a happy
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fault indeed, because it is the beginning and the precondition for 
human knowledge and human freedom alike. But it is also the 
origin of man’s expulsion from Paradise, and of the second, real, 
prohibition of eating the fruit of the Tree of Life. It is the source 
of man’s estrangement and (what is the same thing) of man’s 
consciousness of his own finitude. Hegel here gives a 
theological basis for the thesis, which he had first advanced in 
1802, that philosophy is both the agent and the redeemer of ‘the 
fall of man which is in thought’ (ref. der Sündenfall des Denkens) 
(*12). That is so because self-consciousness has a dynamic 
which can only go forward, not back, because it has been set in 
motion by God himself at the dawn of humanity. Yet the story of 
Eden is indeed the story of a fall: the beginning of alienation and 
of what Hegel calls the ‘infinite anguish (of human beings) 
concerning themselves’ (LPR 447).
Hegel’s reading of the Fall is thus, at once, ontological and 
existential. It is an ontological account of the meaning and 
possibility of fully self-conscious knowledge, but it is also an 
existential account of the consequences of that knowledge.
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This double affirmation is of the greatest possible relevance to 
Hegel's understanding of the role of philosophy in the 
conceptual mediation of the truth of Spirit, and thus to his 
conception of the theological task of philosophy in his age. This 
relevance is apparent above all in the account which Hegel gives 
of the relationship between the biblical narrative itself and its 
interpretation. He argues that “the expression ‘the first human 
being’ signifies humanity in itself or humanity as such -  not 
some single, contingent individual, not one among many, but 
the absolutely first one, humanity according to its concept” (LPR 
443). However, this essential truth of humanity cannot be 
represented as a concept; because its import is precisely that 
something has happened to humanity, that humanity has a 
condition which is also the precondition for all human thought 
and experience. Thus the Fall must be represented as a 
particular event occasioned by the act of a particular first 
human, which is nevertheless transmitted to humanity as such 
because of inherited sin. For Hegel, then, the Fall is both a 
contingent and a necessary truth. It is necessary because it 
defines the meaning of human self-consciousness in relation to
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God, but contingent because it does so as something which has 
‘happened’ to humanity as such: something for which every 
human being is responsible but which no existing human being 
has initiated. Indeed, it is a truth which is necessarily 
contingent: one which can adequately be communicated only by 
a contingent and particular narrative.
Hegel’s account of the Fall illustrates the existential correlative 
of a philosophy of absolute knowledge. The possibility of such 
knowledge, he argues, is grounded in a spiritual revelation 
which is one of disjunction, indeed of alienation, as much as it is 
one of reconciling insight. This ambivalence is itself apparent 
as much in the distance between the form of the narrative and 
its interpretation as it is in Hegel’s own understanding of the 
doctrine of the Fall. Hegel’s examination of the Fall thus shows 
a new way of conceptualizing the problem of the positivity of the 
Christian religion which is also the problem of mediation and 
immediacy which is the key problem of Christian theology in his 
time. Hegel has shown that the apparent divorce of the positive 
biblical narrative from its reflective interpretation is not the
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result of the importing of critical philosophy into the domain of 
Christian experience. On the contrary, it is intrinsic to that 
experience itself. Thus the tension between positivity and 
inwardness, which Hegel in his early writings had identified as 
the most important problem for Christian theology, has now 
become part of Christian theology: a problem which is also an 
opportunity, because it sets the agenda both for salvation 
history and for the Christian theological tradition.
Hegel’s theology of the Fall conceives of the problem of human 
subjectivity in terms of a story of alienation which is also the 
story of the birth of human freedom and self-consciousness. 
That story is implicitly also human history itself. The narrative 
of the Fall represents that history by an allegorical account 
which, appropriate to its Old Testament origins, points the 
reader to a sphere of interpretation lying beyond the positive 
events which it describes. In his theology of the Incarnation, 
Hegel will show, by means of a trinitarian theology of embodied 
Spirit, how God is involved in experientially defined human 
history and how this involvement defines the mode of its
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interpretation. Later in this chapter I shall examine in some 
detail at Hegel’s theology of the Incarnation. First, however, I 
shall put that later theology into context by outlining the account 
of the difference between Judaism and Christianity which Hegel 
gives in The Philosophy of Religion and shall consider how that 
account has moved beyond the position of the Early Theological 
Writings.
(vi) The difference between Judaism and Christianity
For Hegel, the key difference between Judaism and Christianity 
is that Judaism conceives of God not as immanent, but as the 
absolute other, as non-phenomenally objective (*13). Hegel 
refers to the oriental religious maxim that ‘God has many 
names’. In Judaism, however, the name of God is singular and 
absolute rather than predicative: the I am or I am who am in the 
Hebrew language is in this tradition held to be sacred in itself 
and, in token of this sanctity, is not to be spoken or written. The 
absolute otherness of God entails the idea of finitude, which is 
itself contrary to that of the absolute. In the Jewish Hebrew
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scriptures the name of God was indicated only by four dots in 
the text in place of the written name and was always referred to 
obliquely as ‘the word'. In Judaism, God creates man ‘in his own 
image’ and wrestles all night with Jacob so that he (Jacob) will 
be called 'Israel’ {he who has struggled with God); he is the small 
voice of calm which speaks to Elijah through earthquake, wind 
and fire. He is the jealous God. Nevertheless, in all of this God 
remains, paradoxically, completely other.
The God of Judaism, then, is mediated negatively. The religion 
which has God as entirely ‘other’ represents him in the 
sanctification of His name, which may not be spoken or seen, 
and His power over the lives of men is referred to abstractly by 
means of symbols conjured into the mind’s-eye by words alone. 
This is religion acknowledging its own finitude. Judaism has an 
implicit belief in the Infinite which encompasses it, but cannot 
believe in the possibility of any adequate consciousness of the 
Infinite. God is acknowledged by default, but is never explicitly 
an object of consciousness.
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The Jewish abhorrence of, and strict taboo upon, the depiction 
of God by means of graven imagery or by idolatry in any form is 
significantly reflected in The New Testament book of The 
Revelation to Saint John. Because there is, in the Jewish 
tradition, no iconography whatsoever as a focus for devotion, 
the visual imagination had great scope, to which Saint John’s 
graphic account, pregnant with references to bizarre visual 
symbols, testifies.
However, it is the passage at the beginning of the first of the two 
major Johanine texts which best illustrates how Hegel’s 
understanding of the Incarnation as the resolution of Judaism’s 
problem of the finitude of God is firmly rooted in traditional 
Christian doctrine, even if the problem which it seeks to resolve 
had not before seemed so central to the concerns of Christian 
theologians. A belief in the infinitude of a God who -  in the 
Jewish tradition -  remains ‘completely other’ is, to Hegel, 
incomprehensible since it is without any conceptually 
discernible content. By contrast, John’s use of the Greek logos 
(Àoyoç) for the name of God is God objectified, God as reason 
making himself objective to himself: the ‘word made flesh’.
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Hegel’s account in The Philosophy of Religion of the difference 
between Judaism and Christianity represents a decisive 
advance beyond the position of the Early Theological Writings. 
Now, for the first time, Hegel sees Christianity as explicitly 
representing the full reconciliation of man to God. He now 
proffers a doctrine of Incarnation which is integrally related to a 
doctrine of the Fall. Judaism and Christianity are neither 
antithetical nor analogous to one another. For the mature Hegel, 
Christianity has disclosed the meaning of the absolute distance 
between man and God (which he takes to be constitutive of 
Judaism) and has overcome that distance.
For the early Hegel, Christianity was analogous to Judaism 
either because (as in The Positivity of the Christian Religion) its 
positive modern practice was at odds with living faith, or 
because (as in The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate) the 
consciousness of the early Christians was of an absent, not a 
present Lord. Now Hegel sees such self-divided modes of 
Christian belief as consequences of a false and alienated 
understanding of Christian truth: one which fails to grasp the 
meaning for Christian theology as well as for Christian
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experience of the paramount Christian doctrine of Incarnation. It 
is to Hegel’s treatment of that doctrine that I will now turn.
(vii) The Incarnation: the Self-mediation of Spirit in History
The focus of Hegel’s theology of Incarnation is his idea of the 
historicity of Spirit. As has been remarked, his theology of the 
Fall posits a necessary disjunction between the contingent 
historicity of man’s condition and the history of human self- 
consciousness which the Fall inaugurates. In the Incarnation, 
however, contingent history becomes also the history of God for 
the Spirit. Salvation history is also the secular history of 
humanity; the only difference is in the consciousness of the 
meaning of historical contingency which the coming of Christ 
makes possible. Hegel now sees the task of the Christian 
neither (as he had done in The Positivity of the Christian Religion) 
as that of reconnecting a lifeless modern practice to an original 
Christian revelation, nor (as in The Spirit of Christianity and Its 
Fate) as that of reconciling a longing for a risen but departed 
Lord with participation in the real secular world. For Hegel in
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The Philosophy of Religion, the question of how to live in the real 
secular world is the same as that of how to be a Christian. It is 
because of the Incarnation that the meaning of historical 
contingency is the meaning of Christian faith. What is 
specificaiiy Christian is not a particular part of history, still less 
a transcendence which history constantly suggests but never 
embodies; but a particular attitude to the history which the 
Christian shares with the whole of humankind.
This new perspective has profound implications for the manner 
in which Hegel expounds the Christological texts of the New 
Testament. Unlike his treatment of the Fall, Hegel’s treatment of 
the Incarnation cannot assume a cleavage between the 
contingent narrative and its interpretation. That is so because, 
in the Christian understanding, the New Testament narrative 
both defines the condition of historical contingency and 
(because of its Trinitarian premises) contains within itself the 
resources with which to furnish an adequate Christian 
understanding of that condition. This raises an entirely new 
problem related to the historicity of the bibiicai account.
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For Hegel, the problem of interpretation presented by the 
narrative of the Incarnation is the opposite of that posed by the 
story of the Fall. The problem, now, is not that the spheres of 
narrative and interpretation are necessarily disjoined, but that 
they are absolutely congruent. The historicity of the life of 
Christ must also be the historicity of Spirit: Incarnation. The 
narrative form in which that life is reported in scripture cannot 
therefore be incidental to, let alone separable from, the truth of 
Incarnation itself. The problem now is not how to connect but 
how (if at all) to separate, narrative and interpretation. If Spirit is 
fully embodied in the particular Person of Christ at a particular 
time, in what sense does Christ represent all other human 
persons born before and since his ministry? What is the 
relationship between present, and thus equally historically 
contingent, faith and the event of the Incarnation upon which it 
depends?
The Trinitarian theology, which Hegel defended as integral to 
Christianity is, for him, the solution to these problems. Hegel’s 
account of the witness of the Spirit and his treatment of the Holy
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Spirit (Heiliger Geist) is grounded in the philosophical doctrine of 
Spirit which comes to fruition in his mature philosophy of 
religion. The Trinity, then, has God the Father creating man in 
his own image. Evil, Hegel maintains, is the knowledge of the 
disjunction between self and other; it is negation of what is.
Man does not know himself or his own otherness until 
acquisition of the knowledge of Good and Evil, the dawning of 
self-consciousness, makes him God's other and makes him 
know that he is God's other. The asking of the question, ‘What 
am I?' or ‘What is God?’ caused God in the Genesis account to 
expel Adam and Eve from Paradise:
“ ... the man is become as one of us, to know Good and Evil ...” 
(Genesis 3, 22).
Yet such questions are, for Hegel, the beginning and the end of 
Philosophy and the object of true religion.
The second person of the Trinity is God the Son. Trinitarian 
theology in Christianity dates back to the Church Fathers at
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least but, as such, does not appear in the Gospel accounts at all; 
and indeed the Jewish tradition of the Messiah is always 
couched in terms of ‘God’s elected one’ or ‘God’s anointed one’, 
and never refers to God himself as incarnate and born of 
woman. The identity of the Son of God with God the Father, with 
God Incarnate as God the Son, is as essential to Hegel’s 
Christianity as it was to that of the Church Fathers and to the 
Lutheran Church.
God becoming completely and truly human in all respects is 
God objectifying himself in Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ. 
Incarnation is God’s realisation of himself, and the reconciliation 
of himself to himself; it is also the reconciliation of the human 
subject to its own other. The Fall of Adam was God’s 
estrangement of self from self, God’s estrangement from himself 
as object, from himself as his own other; God is estranged from 
all mankind. The Incarnation, then, is the reconciliation of God 
with God, of God with all humanity and of humanity with itself. 
The Incarnation of God as Christ is religion’s articulation of the 
self-conscious realization of self, as subject and object 
transcending estrangement in reconciliation.
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Paradoxical as it may appear, it is Hegel’s emphasis on the 
historical contingency of the Passion which both grounds his 
later Trinitarian theology and connects it to his wider 
philosophical endeavour. For Hegel:
The appearance of the God-Man has to be viewed from two 
different perspectives at once. First he is a human being in 
accord with his external circumstances. This is the non­
religious perspective (irreligiose Betrachtung) in which he appears 
as an ordinary human being” (LPR458 etseq.).
However, this standpoint, which considers Christ only as a 
teacher of ethics who emerges at a particular point in human 
cultural history, cannot be the position of Christian theology:
“When Christ is viewed in the same light as Socrates, then he is 
regarded as an ordinary human being, just as in Islam he is 
regarded as a messenger of God in the general sense that all 
great men are messengers of God. If one says no more of Christ
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than that he is a teacher of humanity, a martyr to the truth, one 
is not adopting the religious standpoint; one says no more of 
him than of Socrates” (LPR 458 etseq.).
This is because the Incarnation is God entering history. The 
Incarnation is the reconciliation of God (as the divided self) to 
himself. In the creation of man -  the finite out of the infinite -  
God has divided the infinite; the infinite is estranged from itself 
in finitude. Reconciliation through Incarnation is God incarnate 
in all humankind: for Christ must be all human beings.
The entry into history must come not just from above but from 
the Other: it does not negate human history but changes our 
understanding of what that history is and means, by changing 
our relationship to our own humanity. Incarnation brings about 
a changed relationship of the human Spirit to itself, although 
that change is already implicit:
“Second, there is the perspective that occurs in the Spirit or with 
the Spirit. Spirit presses toward its truth because it has an
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infinite cleavage an'd anguish within itself. It wills the truth; the 
need of the truth and the certainty thereof it will have, and must 
have. Here for the first time we have the religious view {das 
Religiosef (LPR 458 et seq.).
For Hegel in The Philosophy of Religion, the Spirit is indeed really 
present, because really human. His Christology emphatically 
portrays Christ as a particular: what he calls ‘just one human 
being’ who appears ‘in the flesh’ (cf John 1 vv14) (LPR455). The 
appearance of Christ is not the manifestation of an idea but the 
self-disclosure of a person:
“The necessity (that the divine-human unity shall appear) is not 
first apprehended by means of thinking; rather it is a certainty 
for humanity. In other words, this content -  the unity of divine 
and human nature -  achieves certainty, obtaining the form of 
immediate sensible intuition and external existence for 
humankind, so that it appears as something that has been seen 
in the world, something that has been experienced. ... Humanity 
in itself as such is the universal, or the thought of humanity.
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From the present standpoint, however, it is not a question of the 
thought of humanity but of sensible certainty; thus it is just one 
human being in whom this unity is envisaged -  humanity as 
singular, or in the determinacy of singularity and particularity” 
(LPR 454 -  455).
Incarnation, then, is about real self-recognition is a really 
existing, particular Other Person. The Other Person is also the 
Other of humanity. Hegel’s treatment of the life and passion of 
Christ in The Philosophy of Religion is unique in his system. 
Unlike in his Eariy Theologicai Writings, Hegel’s treatment in the 
later work is not chiefly concerned with the spirituality of post- 
Kantian Lutheran Germany, or even with the reaction of the 
primitive Christian community to the disappearance of Christ 
from the world and the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost. Nor, 
however, is Hegel’s Christology primarily focused upon the 
trinitarian implications of the idea of spirit. On the contrary, 
Hegel’s concern is now with the story of Christ’s passion, and 
the person of Christ as a suffering and humiliated individual 
whose death is an entirely contingent and particular, a really
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human, death. Mo re ver, as the death of a malefactor it stands ‘in 
stark contradiction to the worldly authority' (LPR 462 -  463). In 
The Philosophy of Religion, Hegel understands the Gospel 
accounts as historical in an entirely different sense from that of 
his earlier writings and that of his speculative philosophy of 
history. He uses the term Geschichte (story) to refer to the life of 
Christ in a sense deliberately distinct from that other meaning -  
‘history’ -  which informs Hegel’s usage in all his other mature 
works.
“The truth to which human beings have attained by means of 
this history {Geschichte), what they have become conscious of in 
this entire history, is the following: that the idea of God has 
certainty for them, that humanity has attained the certainty of 
unity with God, that the human is the immediately present God. 
Indeed, within this history as spirit comprehends it, there is the 
very presenta tion o f the process of what humanity, what spirit is 
-  implicitly both God and dead” (LPR 468).
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In The Philosophy of Religion, Hegel’s treatment of the Incarnation 
Is not (as it is in The Philosophy of History) part of a cultural 
narrative of European Christendom. The death of Christ is not 
to be understood as a world-historical event or as the beginning 
of a new stage in European culture. The ‘meaning’ of the 
suffering and death of Christ was not and could not be 
discerned by his disciples as it happened. It becomes apparent 
only after the Ascension, which is the precondition for the 
coming of the spirit which will lead them into all truth (cf John 
14:25-26 & LPR 467 -  468).
The order of priority in Hegel’s account in the Early Theological 
Writings is thus reversed. His concern now is not, in the first 
place, the spiritual life of the early Christian community and its 
yearning for an absent God but with the immediate truth of the 
present God: a truth Which is now recognized to be inseparable 
from the suffering of humanity and wholly resistant to 
appropriation by any philosophy of history.
Hegel’s account of the Crucifixion is striking above all for its 
dissociation of the value of Christ’s sacrifice from any cultural
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source of value. Christ’s death is described not only as a 
natural event but as the most degrading and dishonourable form 
of death: one entirely at odds with every existing positive social 
ethic. It is with this emphasis, which becomes even stronger 
with Hegel’s revision of his lecture manuscripts from 1827 to 
1831, that Hegel introduces his version of the doctrine of the 
Resurrection (LPR 468 CF 465 for 1831 MS). At this point, if at 
no other, Hegel’s work can be defended against the charge of 
Karl Barth (*14), later taken up by Karl Popper (*15) that Hegel’s 
theology is a legitimation of political and cultural power. As 
Andrew Shanks points out (*16), Hegel’s theology of human 
culture is inclusive only because it is rooted in an identification 
of Christ with those whom culture has marginalized.
Hegel resolutely refuses to assimilate either the Person of 
Christ, or the Church of his Disciples, to the cultural narrative of 
Christendom. However, he also refuses to accept Christ as the 
leader of a sect at odds with secular history. Hegel thus avoids 
the triumphalist temptations of both Catholic and Protestant 
theology. For Hegel, Christ is not the master of culture or
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inwardness, but the suffering servant irrevocably engaged with 
every part of historical experience but fully absorbed by none.
For Hegel therefore, in The Philosophy of Religion, the problems 
raised by the historicity of the Gospel accounts are thus quite 
different from those addressed in his Eariy Theologicai Writings. 
The problem of the authenticity or otherwise of Christian faith is 
no longer (as it was in The Positivity of the Christian Religion) one 
which is concerned with the gulf between the positivity of 
modern Christian practice and the immediate faith of the 
primitive Christians in the Apostolic age. Nor is it (as it was in 
The Spirit of Christianity And its Fate) a problem of replication of 
the alienation of the early Christians, yearning for the return of 
their ascended Lord, in the experience of modern Protestant 
Europe. Nor is it the problem Lessing perceived, that of the 
‘broad ditch' between contingent truths of history and necessary 
truths of reason. For Hegel, now, the reality of Incarnation is the 
precondition for the Christian reading of history; not the other 
way around. Incarnation is for Hegel ontological and by its very 
nature has to take a contingent historical form. In Hegel's
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theology, Jesus of Nazareth is indeed an historical individual in 
whom God became man, a being in time and space, and so the 
embodied reconciliation of the divine and the human. In order to 
accept that theology on its own terms, all that has to be believed 
is that Jesus of Nazareth really lived and was crucified under 
Pontius Pilate. Hegel’s account of the meaning of that event, 
and thus his doctrine of the Resurrection, is an ontological one 
which does not depend for its coherence upon the evidence of 
historical criticism of the Biblical texts. However, Hegel’s 
ontology derives its force from his insistence that the 
philosophy of absolute knowledge must be fully exposed to the 
existential truth embodied in Christ’s Passion. Hegel’s 
speculative doctrine of absolute spirit, which is an ontology of 
both human subjectivity and human knowledge of God, is 
credible only if it can be related to the account of human 
subjectivity which his mature Christology offers.
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(viii) Critical Summary
An assessment of that credibility must consist of two related 
judgements. First, it is to be decided whether Hegel's 
conception of philosophy as a theologically indispensable 
activity, and his realization of that conception in his own 
trinitarian theology, is both philosophically and theologically 
cogent. Secondly, it is to be determined whether Hegel’s mature 
Christology can be related to his speculative doctrine in a 
manner which neither neutralizes its existential content nor 
requires that his theology be judged on criteria radically 
different to those applicable to his speculative thought. Both of 
these judgements bear upon the problem of human subjectivity 
as set forth in Hegel’s thought and upon the relationship 
between Hegel’s early and later works. The first judgement 
concerns the coherence of Hegel’s thesis, first expressed in the 
Faith and Knowledge essay and eventually worked out in his 
mature speculative system, that the problems of post-Kantian 
Lutheran Christianity can be resolved only by a philosophy of 
Absolute Spirit in the Hegelian mode. The second judgement
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concerns an assessment of the relationship between Hegel’s 
early and later works; whether Hegel’s mature philosophical 
theology resolves or evades the theological crisis which he 
delineates in his early writings. The existential implication of 
Hegel’s doctrine of absolute spirit is made manifest only in his 
mature philosophy of religion and more specifically in his 
mature Christology. The assessment of the success or 
otherwise of Hegel’s mature philosophical theology is therefore 
also an assessment of the extent to which that theology 
addresses and resolves, and does not simply ignore, the 
theological problem of human subjectivity as outlined in Hegel’s 
early work. It is to such a universal judgement as this that I will 
now turn.
It has been shown that the concept of Spirit, first outlined in The 
Spirit of Christianity And Its Fate and more fully articulated in his 
mature speculative system, is a response to the problem of 
human subjectivity which was itself first set forth in Hegel’s 
Eariy Theologicai Writings. The (philosophical) concept of Spirit 
enables Hegel to address key contemporary theological
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dualisms such as the tension between pietistic inwardness and 
positivistic religious practice, and the inadequacy of the 
theologies of inwardness and deistic rationalism as responses 
to the post-Kantian doctrine of the intellectual inaccessibility of 
God. The concept of Spirit has such significance because it is a 
moment of self-conscious knowledge. It articulates Hegel's 
insight that the gap between immediate experience and 
reflective knowledge, which is apparent in the philosophical 
theology of his time, can only be bridged by a development 
towards, rather than a withdrawal from, that fully self-conscious 
theology which has already begun. It is for this reason that 
Hegel’s doctrine of Spirit must be a philosophical one. Hegel’s 
reference at the end of his Faith and Knowledge essay to a 
‘Speculative Good Friday’ makes clear, however, that his 
doctrine of the theological necessity of philosophy pertains not 
only to theological dialectic, but to Christian experience.
Indeed, Hegel speaks there of philosophy as the catalyst of a 
real, and not notional, apprehension of the meaning of the 
Passion of Christ. Speculative philosophy, Hegel asserts, 
enables the Passion of Christ to be understood not just as an
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historical event but as an existentially real and immediate one 
which is ‘restored to the full truth and harshness of its God­
forsakenness.’
Hegel thus regards speculative thought as an experience 
intrinsically related to that of Christian faith. He considers 
philosophy to be an absolutely presuppositionless mode of 
knowledge which is not logically compelled to assent to the 
doctrine of Spirit in religious terms. Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit 
enjoins that assent only by drawing attention to the self-division 
in experience which the failure to assent would produce. That 
indirect and implicit argument is of great relevance to any 
estimate of the success or otherwise of his philosophical 
theology and for his identification of the scope of philosophy 
with that of Christian experience. Hegel’s warning, that the 
withholding of religious assent would make his doctrine of Spirit 
‘empty and vain’, that it would Imply a retreat Into self-enclosed 
subjectivity, takes its force from an understanding that the 
object of Hegel’s philosophy is indeed the totality of truth which 
is God. Hegel warns that the refusal of religious assent, whilst
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logically coherent, is the consequence of a sterile irony which 
alienates one from a full apprehension of the truth. The logic of 
Hegel’s argument, no less than that of Kierkegaard, shows that 
only by making a leap of faith may one move from a purely 
philosophical to a properly theological apprehension of his 
doctrine of Spirit.
Hegel does not use the language of faith or of immediate 
personal commitment in his exposition of that paradox, which is 
nonetheless implicit in his thought. It is the idiom as much as 
the substance of Hegel’s religious thought which appears to 
lend credence to Kierkegaard’s charges that Hegel wants to 
‘arrange the truth of Christianity in paragraphs’ (*17), and has 
truly forgotten the really existing individual who is both the 
subject of Christian belief and the writer and reader of every 
philosophy. Hegel can be defended against these charges only 
through that understanding of the connection between his 
doctrine of Absolute Spirit and his mature Christology which 
emerges as a response to the problems he treats in his Early 
Theological Writings. The central concern of all Hegel’s
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philosophical and theological work is to reconcile the modern 
idea of subjectivity with the idea of God. The primary difference 
between Hegel and his modern theological critics (of whom 
Kierkegaard was the first and, subsequently, the most 
influential) is that Hegel perceives of the modern discourse 
about subjectivity, which had reached a crisis in the theology of 
his day, as a hindrance rather than as a help to that 
reconciliation. For Hegel to endorse (as did Kierkegaard) the 
“passion of the infinite” in the soul of the believer as the sole 
criterion of religious truth would be for him to endorse that 
‘unhappy consciousness' in the theological culture of his time 
which it is his constant endeavour to overcome. However, it 
would be seriously misleading to conclude from this that Hegel’s 
thought is not concerned with the relevance of human 
subjectivity to Christian belief.
The relevance is most fully apparent in the interdependence of 
Hegel’s Christology and his mature philosophy of Spirit. Hegel’s 
philosophical doctrine of Absolute Spirit may persuade one to 
believe in a paradox: that presuppositionless knowledge has its
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precondition in the embodiment of truth in the world which is 
Spirit and therefore Incarnation. Hegel’s Christology shows one 
the human meaning of that paradox: that there is a precondition 
in human experience for what Hegel means by Absolute 
Knowledge. At this moment, if at no other, in Hegel’s thought 
the philosophical mind must be, and know itself to be, wholly 
impotent in relation to experience. Hence Hegel’s thought must 
acknowledge Incarnation as a real and not a metaphysical gift.
Hegel’s Christology is thus both the part of his mature system 
which most directly relates to the problems of his early work, 
and the source of a certain disjunction in his mature thought. 
That disjunction is an integral part of Hegel’s philosophical 
achievement and is relevant to the structure of his thought as a 
whole. As Gillian Rose maintains, Hegel at the close of The 
Philosophy of Religion addresses the social and cultural 
consequences of the reinterpretation of Christian belief which 
his philosophy would itself enact. Hegel acknowledges that the 
philosophical reconciliation of alienated subjectivity to the 
objective form of modern culture, even if that reconciliation is
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real, is nevertheless partial, because it is accessible only to that 
‘isolated order of priests’ (*18) which is the modern intellectual 
class. Gillian Rose interprets this as a rare moment in which 
Hegel ‘simply despairs’ of the rationality of the real. This 
despair, however, is also a necessary acknowledgment of the 
human paradox inherent in a philosophy of Absolute Knowledge 
which is also a philosophy of Incarnation. Without it, Hegel 
would indeed be Kierkegaard’s ‘innkeeper or professor of 
philosophy who imagines that he is a shrewd enough fellow to 
detect anything, unless God gives the condition’ (*19). Hegel’s 
political theology would indeed have abandoned the radical 
critique of Christendom as is to be found in the Early Theological 
Writings in favour of a triumphalist theology of culture. Hegel, in 
short, would have done what Karl Barth accuses him of doing: 
he would have substituted his dialectical logic for the true logic 
of Grace, and thus in his philosophy have produced an obstacle, 
not a means, to the reception of Christian truth.
Hegel’s coupling of a speculative doctrine of Spirit with a real 
theology of the Cross is not indicative of an all-encompassing
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ambition in his thought and thus of its necessary failure: on the 
contrary, it is the vindication of any claim to theological 
relevance of his thought and also the point at which his system 
is most evidently vulnerable to the critique of experience. It is 
not by accident that The Philosophy of Religion is the most open- 
ended of Hegel’s major works. Unlike The History of Philosophy, 
Hegel’s final (1831) manuscript of The Philosophy of Religion ends 
not with harmony but with dissonance (*20). The disharmony 
(Misston) between philosophical interpretation and the reality of 
historical experience is not just incidentally acknowledged but is 
intrinsic to the nature of Hegel’s undertaking. In The Spirit of 
Christianity And Its Fate Hegel exposed the traumatic 
consequences for the early Christian community of the 
Disciples’ belief that salvation history had come to an end with 
the Ascension of their risen Lord. In his later work he shows 
that it is precisely that disappearance which is the precondition 
for the Spirit’s presence amongst them after the first Pentecost. 
Any modern Christian reading of Hegel must similarly insist that 
his theology can be vindicated only by its openness to future 
experience. Understanding the continuity between Hegel’s Eariy
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Theological Writings and his apparently very different speculative 
system also enables one to understand the relevance of both to 
contemporary (and especially religious) experience.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis is concerned with an aspect of Hegel’s work which 
has long been neglected. In the early part of this century 
Hegel's religious thought was largely of interest only to 
theologians. The ‘linguistic’ turn of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy, in addition to the logical separability of Hegel’s 
secular system from his theological works, meant that Hegel s 
theology was long considered to be one of the most dated, if not 
dead, parts of his speculative philosophical system. Whenever 
it was seriously considered at all by commentators, it was often 
dismissed as being an obstacle which, because of the spiritual 
arrogance and cultural prejudice which the integration of 
theology into a speculative system seemed to entail, inhibited 
any acceptance of Hegel’s thought as a whole.
However, in the last thirty years the religious writings have 
become a more central concern of Hegel scholarship than they 
had been in the previous half-century. With the advent of 
deconstruction, and the consequent questioning of the dividing 
line between philosophy and other forms of discourse, Hegel’s
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religious thought has stimulated considerable interest both in 
his theology and in the possibly ‘religious’ character of his 
thought as a whole. This change is wholly appropriate, not just 
because Hegel stated that his philosophy could be adequately 
understood only in theological terms, but also because the 
debate as to whether the thought of Hegel is to be granted 
theological or secular status is of the utmost importance to its 
reception and to its relevance today. As philosophers have 
begun to take Hegel’s philosophical theology seriously, they 
have also started to pay serious attention to his early theological 
writings, which have been long neglected in relation to his 
thought as a whole. This second development is highly 
important, because the movement of Hegel’s thought from those 
writings to his mature system illuminates both the promise and 
the difficulty of his philosophical theology. It is in this evolution 
that the nature of Hegel’s problematic attempt to link speculative 
philosophy with Christian theology becomes most fully 
apparent.
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It is with that development that this thesis is concerned. It set 
out to do two things: to demonstrate a continuity in Hegel’s 
theological concerns from his Early Theological Writings to The 
Philosophy of Religion, and to show that Hegel’s later resolution 
of the problems set out in his early writings does indeed 
adequateiy address, rather than speculatively evade, that 
tension between secular reason and Christian beiief which Hegel 
had earlier identified as characteristic of the intellectual life of 
his time. My argument has focused upon the problem of human 
subjectivity-the relationship between human self- 
consciousness and human consciousness of God -  as 
expressed in Hegel’s religious thought. Hegel’s mature concept 
of speculative philosophy, I have argued, should be seen as a 
response to a problem which is theologically as well as 
philosophically relevant. However, his later philosophy of 
religion cannot be reduced to that conceptual definition of 
religion as a mode of Absolute Spirit which he proffers in the 
last part of his Berlin Encyclopaedia. On the contrary, his later 
philosophical theology includes a persuasive account of the 
tension, in addition to the connection, between Christian
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experience and speculative thought. This account reaches its 
climax in the doctrine of the Incarnation which Hegel presents in 
the second part of The Philosophy of Religion.
Hegel's early theological writings are, therefore, in no sense 
irrelevant to his speculative philosophical endeavouff On the 
contrary, they define the cultural and theological problem to 
which that endeavour responds and also, at least in part, lay 
down the kind of criteria one might use in assessing its success. 
Hegel’s mature Philosophy of Reiigion can neither be set against 
his Early Theological Writings nor be credibly presented as a 
definitive speculative resolution of the problems which those 
early writings raise. As Emil Fackenheim (*1), Raymond Plant 
(*2) and J. N. Findlay (*3) have indicated, the later Hegel believed 
that the theological antinomies of his age could, in the last 
analysis, only be resolved in philosophical terms. Hegel’s 
philosophy does Indeed (as he hoped to have dem onstra ted  in 
the Faith and Knowledge essay) meet the need which arises from 
the self-division in the Christian Consciousness of Hegel’s time. 
It can meet that need only at the cost of acknowledging a
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paradox: that of philosophy’s being necessarily connected to 
the whole of Christian experience and yet unable (contrary to 
Croce’s charge) ‘to reduce that experience to itself’. That 
paradox is manifest above all in Hegel’s mature Christology 
which does not, contrary to what John Milbank (*4) claims, 
neutralize the conflict between the modern Christian conscience 
and the claims of the ‘Christian’ state. Rather, the opposite is 
the case. Hegel’s mature Christology shows the meaning of that 
conflict and its relevance to philosophical theology. Hegel’s 
Trinitarian doctrine of Absolute Spirit cannot be separated from ; 
the existential Christology which he presents in The Philosophy 
of Religion.
Andrew Shanks has argued (*5) that Hegel’s ‘inclusive 
Christology’ is the necessary and persuasive consequence of 
his critique of the ‘unhappy consciousness’ which he diagnoses 
as definitive of modern Protestantism: the self-legitimation of 
the Christian community through its construction of a 
spirituality which is in opposition to the secular world. However, 
Hegel’s inclusive Christology is not to be had without a cost.
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since there is an inevitable tension between his claim, based 
upon a specifically theological logic, that his system can 
communicate Absolute Knowledge, and the context into which, 
if Hegel’s theological works are to be taken seriously, that claim 
must operate. So that speculative claim of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Sp/r/f must be contextualised, even subverted, by the real 
Christian theology which he proffers in The Philosophy of 
Reiigion. This paradoxical relationship also means that the 
problems raised by Hegel’s Early Theological Writings are 
‘resolved’ in his later work only in the sense that their meaning 
is then fully disclosed: a meaning which pertains indeed to what 
Karl Barth (*6) called the ‘logic of Grace’ as well as to the logic of 
speculative dialectic. Thus the questions arising from Hegel’s 
early writings -  questions concerning the differences between 
lived experience and positive doctrine, modern belief and its 
historical warrant, philosophical rationalization and immediate 
experience -  are not abolished, but rather preserved and more 
powerfully restated in his later work.
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If this is so, then much of what has been persistently regarded 
as peripheral to Hegel’s thought belongs more properly at its 
centre. For example, Hegel’s acknowledgement (at the close of 
The Philosophy of Religion) (*7) that the synthesis between 
theoiogical consciousness and philosophical reflection cannot 
diminish, but may indeed increase, the tension between those 
two spheres of experience, derives from the paradox at the heart 
of Hegel’s religious thought. This paradox, which his 
speculative system proffers, is that a philosophy of Absolute 
Knowledge, if it is to be credible and especially if it is to be i. 
Christian, must find a means of acknowledging its own infirmity 
in relation to experience. Hegel’s own acknowledgement is thus ; 
not an aberration on the margins of his thought but rather an 
affirmation which lies at its heart. I have sought, in this thesis, 
to demonstrate that such a synthesis is borne out of the creative 
tension between theological consciousness and philosophical 
reflection (as much as by the successful progression from 
Hegel’s earlier to his later theology) and also from the 
ambivalent relationship between that theology and the structure 
of his philosophical thought as a whole. Much of the power of
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Hegel’s theology and the source of much of its influence at the 
time in which it was written, lies in its exposure of a certain kind 
of false Christian humility: the ‘unhappy consciousness’ of 
modern Protestantism, which justifies its own authoritarian 
practice by appealing to a God who can never be known, but 
who yet commands complete and successful engagement with 
the secular world. It is for this reason that what I have here 
described as Hegel’s theological acknowledgement of the 
infirmity of his speculative thought in relation to experience, has 
to be recognized as implicit, to be reconstructed by Hegel’s 
readers, rather than stated and affirmed explicitly in his text. 
However, nearly two centuries after it was written, and at a time 
in which the potential for ideological abuse of Hegel’s own 
discourse is all too apparent, this creative tension in Hegel’s 
thought can be usefully made more explicit in an interpretation 
of his entire speculative system, and not exclusively of the 
theological works.
Nonetheless, as Fackenheim has illustrated in a recently 
republished essay (*8), Hegel’s thesis of the actuality of the
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rational (and rationality of the actual), is one which can have 
only a theological meaning. To grasp such a meaning is to 
enable one to refute some of the cruder objections which have 
been levelled against Hegel’s central philosophical claim. 
However, as Fackenheim explains, one must be concerned not 
only with meaning, but also with truth. If one is to assent to 
Hegel’s claim, there must be discoverable criteria for 
assessment and questions must be asked about one’s own 
experience, the answers to which may enable one to judge the 
truth of Hegel’s discourse upon experience.
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
(*1 ) Benedetto Croce, What is Living And What Is Dead Of The 
Philosophy Of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie, London, 1915, 
p145ff.
(*2) Kierkegaard, Concludng Unscientific Postscript, trans. Howard 
Hong, Princeton, 1941, p99f.
(*3) See especially Bultmann’s critique of Hegel in History and 
Eschatoiogy, Edinburgh, 1957.
(*4) Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams, 
London, 1951, p192ff.
(*5) Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn 0. 
Hoskyns, Oxford, 1968, p135ff ('Concerning the Value of History").
(*6) Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 
London, 1972, p420.
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(*7) Malcolm Knox, A Layman’s Quest, London, 1969, p i01.
(*8) J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Reexamination, London, 1958, pp49- 
52.
(*9) Emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in HegeTs Thought, 
Chicago, 1967, p7.
(*10) Gillian. Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, London, 1981, p92ff.
(*11) Rowan Williams, ‘Hegel and the Gods of Post-Modernity’, in 
Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (eds.): Shadow of Spirit, 
London, 1992, p72f.
(*12) Raymond Plant, Hegel: an Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1983, pp15-16.
(*13) Andrew Shanks, HegeTs Political Theology, Cambridge, 1991, 
p20ff.
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(*14) op. c/f., p122ff.
(*15) John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1990, pp168-173.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
(*1) My argument here, which is intended only to establish a 
context for my own original exposition of The Positivity of the 
Christian Reiigion and The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, is 
indebted to Richard Kroner's introduction to The Early 
Theological Writings (ETW 5 -  6). The Life of Jesus essay has not 
been translated into English, and is published in German in 
Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Hermann Nohl, 
Tübingen, 1907, pp73- 136.
(*2) The relevant section is the third part of the Encyclopaedia, 
known as The Philosophy of Mind. For Hegel’s definition of these 
terms, see (on Moraiitat) PM 249f and (on Sittiichkeit) PM 253f.
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(*3) I have omitted references to Kant at this stage because my 
focus here is entirely on Hegel’s own text. Detailed references 
to Kant in relation to Hegel’s argument in The Positivity of the 
Christian Religion and The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate are 
given later in this chapter.
(*4) Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and 
ed. H. J. Paton, London, 1948, pp65-67.
(*5) op. cit., ppSS, 98.
(*6) op. cit., p70 (The Categorical Imperative’).
(*7) op. cit., p65f. Kant’s example of the shopkeeper, who 
refrains from short-changing a child only out of concern for his 
reputation, exactly illustrates this point.
(*8) op. cit., pp68 -  69.
(*9) op. c/f., pp99 -  100.
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(*10) op. c/f., p131.
(*11 ) op. cit., p67 et seq.
(*12) op. cit., p76.
(*13) Fackenheim, op. cit., plO.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II
(*1) See, for example, Hegel’s formulation in the text known as 
Fragments of a System (1800):
"Philosophy therefore has to stop short of religion because it is 
a process of thinking and, as such as process implies an 
opposition with non-thinking (processes) as well as the 
opposition between the thinking mind and the object of thought 
... In particular it has to recognise the illusions generated by its 
own infinite and thus to place the true infinite outside its 
confines” (ETW 313).
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(*2) The full title of Hegel’s 1802 essay is Faith and Knowledge, or 
the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of Its 
Forms as Kantian, Jacobian and Fichtean Philosophy.
See especially FK 57ff.
(*3) Hegel: The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
Philosophy, trans H. S. Harris and Walter Cert, Albany, 1977, p89 
(The Need of Philosophy’):
“Dichotomy is the source of the need of philosophy; and as the 
culture of the era, it is the unfree and given aspect of the whole 
configuration.”
(*4) This essay has not been translated into English, but is 
available in Hegel, Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart, 1928, 
vol. 1, pp 171 -  189. (‘Uber das Wesen der philosophischen 
Kritik’) See pp 176 -  177.
(*5) The reference is to Pascal, Pensées, para. 441 (Brünschwieg)
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(*6) In the English translation by William Wallace (from which my 
references are taken) this is referred to as the Philosophy of 
Mind. I use the term Philosophy of Spirit in my own exposition 
to emphasise both the philosophical and theological meanings 
of Hegel's term Geist It will be apparent that this dual meaning 
is directly relevant to my argument.
(*7) Kierkegaard, op. cit., p108, cf p34.
(*8) John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 
Notre Dame, 1979, p86 ff.
(*9) Fackenheim, op. cit., p23.
(*10) This is also the title of one of Hegel's own subsections in 
the 1827 lecture MS (LPR 80 -  99).
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(*11) On Hegel’s doctrine of the Fall, see Fackenheim, op. cit., pp 
129 -  133 (‘Creation and Fall, or the Christian Understanding of 
the Human Condition’).
(*12) Hegel, Über das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik, loc. cit.
(*13) For the following discussion see LPR 357 -  375 (‘The 
Religion of Sublimity, or Jewish Religion’) and 391 -  404 (‘The 
Consummate Religion’).
(*14) See Karl Barth: Credo, 1936, p76f; cf Barth. The Epistle to the 
Romans, p135ff.
(*15) Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, London 
1966, vol. 2, p271f.
(*16) Shanks, op. cit., p 3Iff.
(*17) Kierkegaard, op. cit., p i9.
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(*18) Gillian Rose, op. cit., pi 19.
(*19) Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of 
Philosophy, trans. David Swenson, Princeton, 1936, p52.
(*20) See Gillian Rose's translation, loc. cit.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION
(*1) Fackenheim, op. cit., p160ff (The Transfiguration Of Faith 
Into Philosophy’).
(*2) Plant, op. cit., p79ff.
(*3) Findlay, loc. cit.
(*4) cf Milbank, op. cit., pp172 -  173.
(*5) Shanks, op. cit., pp31 -  34.
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(*6) loc. cit.
(*7) This comes at the close of Hegel’s 1830 MS of the Lectures 
On The Philosophy Of Religion and is not available in LPR. It is, 
however, available in Peter Hodgson’s three volume edition of 
the same work. See Lectures On The Philosophy Of Religion, 3 
vols., ed. and trans. P. C. Hodgson, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1984 -  87.
(*8) Fackenheim, The God Within: Kant, Schelling, And Historicity, 
ed. John Burbidge, Toronto, 1996, pp164 -  171 (‘Hegel On The 
Actuality Of The Rational And The Rationality Of The Actual’).
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